EDITORIAL PREFACE

It is the intention of this "Handbook on Peace Education" to report on the present situation in the international discussion on peace education and to make further development of this new field in the peace movement possible. My plan to edit this handbook is based on the perception that peace education has recently become a serious matter in education in many countries. This is accompanied by an increasing interest in peace research and any of its results which are relevant to peace education on the part of many educators. This open-mindedness towards the values, goals and the content of peace research which is frequently set off by considerable interest in education among peace researchers makes education an important area in peace research aimed at the improvement of social reality.

At present we are still at the start of the development of peace education. This is illustrated by the fact that the I P R A Education Committee was set up only two years ago in Bled in Jugoslavia and that the 5th General Conference of I P R A in January 1974 will be the first to have a section on peace education. The fact that we have only recently started to be more deeply concerned with the development of peace education makes this field one of the most challenging in the international peace movement. There are many problems still unsolved which will have to be clarified soon if we are to succeed in establishing peace education in various different regional forms in schools, universities and in life outside these institutions.

It is to be hoped that this handbook will encourage even greater efforts in peace education and will motivate more people to commit themselves in this field of education. Here, the international exchange of ideas and experience about efforts to conceptualize and practise peace education is very important, both within the International Peace Research Association and outside it.

These efforts involve an intensification of cooperation between peace researchers and educators interested in peace education. However, this cooperation should not only concern questions of content, such as deciding on relevant objectives and educational content on a large and a small scale; it must also cover the specific problems of peace education teaching and educational processes and contribute to a more complex understanding of peace education on the basis of the variety of different regional viewpoints. This specifically educational aspect must be given particular attention whenever peace researchers are working on the development of peace education and the requisite strategies in their capacity as subject matter specialists. Because, as wide experience has shown, the complexity of educational processes

is all too easily reduced to specialized questions and thus corrupts the aim of peace education which cannot be made equivalent to the teaching of certain goals and contents but which also covers the necessary non-violent, participatory learning and education processes. Therefore, for peace education the question of ways of conveying contents and strategies of implementation is just as important as the question of content and goals. For this reason an international exchange of views on different approaches, concepts and methods is necessary in both areas.

In view of the present state of development of peace education it seemed to me to be essential to include a number of papers in the handbook which are contributions on the preconditions for and the foundations of peace education. They are to be found in part one, along with various concepts of the function of peace education. In choosing these contributions an attempt was made to cover the many views on peace education which are expressed in different parts of the world. In this process considerable divergency emerged in the different concepts of peace education based on different social preconditions. At the same time, the variety of approaches and target groups was also clearly demonstrated. Among other things, this is apparent in the different interpretation of the role of peace education in the framework of political education, in a different view on the relationship between theory and practice and in a varying degree of readiness to criticize preconditions in one's own case.

Part two of the handbook contains a summary of examples in which an attempt is made to explain peace education in more concrete terms, both in and outside school. These contributions, which stem from an explicit understanding of peace education as criticism of society, are based on a critical approach to peace education and peace research. Their point of departure are central concepts of critical peace education 1) such as "structural violence", "organized peacelessness" and "participation". These reports try to give an impression of the interdependence of international and internal social structures of power and dependence in and outside school. In these approaches to peace education, peace research, peace education and action for peace are seen as being directly related to each other, which is a precondition for them to reach their optimum effectiveness in their respective social context.

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1) Cf.: Christoph Wulf (Ed.): Kritische Friedenserziehung, Frankfurt/Main, Suhrkamp 1973.

A number of reports on efforts to put peace education into practice in various countries are to be found in the third part of the handbook. This section includes reports on the Bad Nauheim Conference on peace education which has become a milestone in our efforts to encourage peace education, at least in Europe; it also includes reports on different strategies for implementation, on a Finnish summer course and a Dutch curriculum project. It contains reports on work in peace education in Belgium, Hungary, Great Britain and the U.S.A. Here again, the variety of international objectives and approaches emerges clearly, and at the present stage in the discussion precludes prematurely reducing this work to a common concept of peace and peace education.

In conclusion I would like to express my sincere thanks to all those who have assisted me in this task:
Susan Treiber-Patton for her translation of much of the handbook;
F. and C.Kuebart for the translation and editing of the contribution by G.N.Filonov;
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Christoph Wulf

I. Peace Education: Concepts and Contributions to its Foundation

KINHIDE MUSHAKOJI (Japan)

PEACE RESEARCH AND EDUCATION IN A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE
- Where Research and Education Meet -

1. Peacelessness in the World

It is not easy to define peace. Any definition will leave some people dissatisfied. Is peace only a state of affairs without war? Does it include the idea of a just order? Although people all around the world are interested in peace, the concrete content we must give to this term is not clear.

Peace research as developed in the Western countries has managed to produce a number of definitions for this ambivalent concept; but, being more complex, peace education or its equivalent in different parts of the world displays great diversity. For those in Europe who have learned through two World Wars how tragic it is for peoples to hate each other, an education for "international understanding" is peace education. 1) For the Indian disciples of the Mahatma, it is in the great tradition of satyagraha and nonviolence that this education finds its roots. 2) In the present writer's country, Japan, this field of pedagogy consists of a collective effort to keep alive the lessons of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. 3) In the United States, the long decade of muddling through a war experience in Vietnam lends education for peace a different tone. Internal

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1) About education for international understanding: cf. UNESCO, International Understanding at School, Paris, 1965.

2) A typical example of an Indian approach to peace education is the Sarvodaya Movement which is active not only in this country but also in Sri Lanka. See for example: Gandhi Peace Foundation, Reclaiming the Outlaws: A Nonviolent Approach (mimeo) New Delhi, 1972. About the movement in Sri Lanka: A.T. Ariatne, Sarvodaya Shramadana - Growth of a People's Movement, Moratuwa, 1972.

3) As a typical textbook produced by the Japanese peace education movement based on the Hiroshima experience cf. Ken-Heiwa-Kyoiku Semmon-Iinkai et al. eds., Hiroshima no Heiwa-Kyoiku (Peace Education based on Hiroshima) (vol.2) Hiroshima, 1972.

inter-racial conflicts in this country play also a role. 4)

To this list of different approaches, we must add all those who teach peace without calling it by name. Today, education for development, for justice, or for many other core values is conducted in different countries using quite different methods. 5) To mention only two among many others, we have the deschooling society of Ivan Illich 6) and the conscientization of Paulo Freire. 7) Are these not both peace education in the truest sense of the word?

In face of such pluralistic attempts to educate for peace, we need a broad definition: not an impoverished common denominator of what all the above trends represent, but rather a logical-sum all-inclusive of the richness contained in the various teachings. It would appear that the best suitable one is that peace is the autonyme of peacelessness. 8) This concept, which clearly includes not only the absence of wars but also ethnic conflicts, social injustices and all the consequences of maldevelopment, seems ideal for our purpose. We start, therefore, by giving our own interpretation of this key concept.

2. Pre-Theory of Peacelessness

Peacelessness is defined as a state of affairs in which the basic value expectations of some groups are perceived to be unrealizable because of the obstruction or the lack of cooperation of others.

Basic value expectation is defined as the set of values a given group perceives as essential to its wellbeing and

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4) About peace education in the United States, see for example: A. Michael Washburn, "Peace Education is Alive - But Unsure of Itself". War/Peace Report, November 1971.

5) About education for development see for example: P.A. Edwards, Education for Development, Bridgetown, Barbados, 1971.

6) Cf. Ivan Illich , Deschooling Society, New York, 1970.

7) Cf. Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, New York, 1970.

8) About the concept of peacelessness first proposed by Sugata Dasgupta, see: Sugata Dasgupta, "Peacelessness and Maldevelopment" International Peace Research Association Proceedings, Vol. II, Netherlands, 1968.

to which it feels justifiably entitled. 9)

The realization of the basic value expectations of any group requires a certain allocation of resources (material, human, and information), about which each group has certain concrete plans they seek to realize. 10) Wherever the plans of several groups overlap they enter into a process of negotiation leading either to cooperation or to conflict depending on how compatible the plans may be. In the latter case, groups use power - political, military, or economic - to secure the realization of their plan. Groups tend to be interrelated to each other within power structures where institutions make certain that the power competitors follow the rules of the game. 11)

When a basic value expectation is left unrealized, the problem lies in (1) the patterns of resource allocation, (2) the communication process, and/or (3) the power structures. Peacelessness should therefore be studied in terms of five aspects: group, value, resource, communication, and power aspects.

Peacelessness is a term which can be used to represent a set of concrete events, in which case we speak of peaceless events composing peaceless situations. It is also used in an analytic sense, in which case we use the term peaceless variables composing peaceless systems.

Peaceless situations can be classified in terms of the nature and the geographic location of the groups involved. We can identify peaceless situations on the local, sub-national, national, international, regional, or global levels. Geographically, an ennumeration of all the situations would correspond to all local, sub-national, national, etc. situations in the world. On the regional level, a rough classification can be made in terms of the commonly used terms - the First, Second and Third Worlds in view of the different patterns of resource allocation and power structures.

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9) We give here a definition of peacelessness based on the concept of basic value expectations to stress on the one hand the fact that peacelessness cannot be defined objectively since it depends on people's values which differ from culture to culture or from social class to social class, and on the other hand the relationship which peacelessness has with violence in the theoretical frame of reference proposed by Ted Gurr. See: Ted R. Gurr, Why Men Rebel, Princeton, 1970, pp. 27-30.

10) On the concept of plan, see: George A. Miller et al., Plans and the Structure of Behavior, New York, 1960

11) About the concepts used in this paragraph, see: Kinhide Mushakoji, Kodo Kagaku to Kokusai Seiji (Behavioral Science and International Politics), Tokyo, 1972, pp. 97-104.

Peaceless situations can further be classified according to the predominant issues they contain and the specific events they generate. There are issues related to resources and the way they are allocated, such as the North-South issues, polution issues, energy resources issues, etc.; there are also issues of discommunication, such as inter-ethnic conflicts, inter-religious conflicts, inter-generation conflicts, etc. And there are issues related to the power relationship and the use and/or abuse of power. All peaceless situations where sovereign states compete for more power - wars, arms, races, etc. - all revolutions and other sub-national conflicts where the power holders and the power aspirants compete belong to this category. The abuse of power, human rights infringements, corruption, suppression of political opposition, etc. belong to this class of issues.

The peaceless systems can be subdivided into subsystems according to the variables involved. Corresponding to the resource allocation aspect of peacelessness we have ecological and economic variables such as population, arable land, urban-industrial land, food, energy resources, gross national product, etc. In relation to communication, beside communication and transaction flow variables, we have a variety of social-psychological variables related to the degree of realization of basic value expectations. We have, for example, perceived value capabilities, relative deprivation, frustration, anomie, aggressiveness, perceived hostility, collective violence, image distortion, etc. As to the power structures, we have variables related to power: coercive control, responsiveness, legitimacy, power capabilities, etc., or to power relations and stratification; ranks and rank disequilibrium, control asymmetry, etc. We have also variables related to the groups involved in the power struggle at one level or the other, such as the number of alliances, the number of multi-national corporations, IGOs and NGOs, as well as the statistics about subnational political groups.

3. A Map of the Peaceless World

Peace research has been mostly concerned with the peaceless system. While many case studies have been made about different peaceless situations, no attempts, to the knowledge of the present writer, have been made to organize a body of knowledge as to how peaceless situations are related to each other.

Since its birth, the new discipline of peace research has continually broadened its range of scrutiny, adding more

and more peaceless variables to its list. 12) In the 1950s, the focus of study was nuclear war and its avoidance. By the 1960s, new theories such as rank theory had started to draw the attention of the researchers to the North-South conflicts, to imperialism, etc.; while new definitions related to peace, such as the one we adopted here, peacelessness, or Johan Galtung's structural violence, emerged to help a wider perspective in the research for peace.

As mentioned above, we have now a good number of peaceless variables belonging to the three subsystems of resources, information, and power. The following list gives only a few of the studies which helped defining them, As to the first subsystem, there are the studies of Rudolph Rummel and Ramond Tanter about the dimensions of international and internal conflicts 13); as to the second, the studies on the mutual perception of antagonist nations before the outbreak of wars made by Robert North and others, as well as the Inter Nation Simulation studies. 14) As to the third, the above-mentioned work on rank theory, the case studies of imperialism, etc. 15)

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12) About the development of peace research see for example: Mari H. Ruge, "Some Characteristics of Peace Research Institutes", in Bengt Höglund et al. eds., Conflict Control and Conflict Resolution, Copenhagen, 1972. See also: Elise Boulding, The Technology of Peace-Making: a Report on Development in Social Science Research on War and Peace in the U.S. (Mimeo.) Ann Arbor, 1962.

13) See for example: Rudolph J. Rummel, "Dimensions of Conflict Behavior within and between Nations" and Raymond Tanter, "Dimensions of Conflict Behavior within and between Nations, 1958-60", in John V. Gillespie et al. eds., Macro-Quantitative Analysis, Beverley Hills, 1971.

14) See for example: Robert C. North, Dina A. Zinnes, and Howard E. Koch, Jr., "Capability, Threat, and the Outbreak of War", in James N. Rosenau ed., International Politics and Foreign Policy, (First Edition). New York, 1961. See also: Harold Guetzkow et al., Simulation in International Relations. Englewood Cliffs, 1963.

15) About rank theory, see for example: Johan Galtung, "Rank and Social Integration. A Multidimensional Approach", in Berger et al. eds., Sociological Theories in Progress. Boston, 1965. Among studies of imperialism within the peace research tradition, see for example: Claes Brundenius, "The Anatomy of Imperialism: Multinational Mining Corporations in Peru", Journal of Peace Research, No. 3, 1972.

Despite this considerable achievement, peace research does not seem to satisfy the needs of those peace agents who work in different peaceless situations. While the reality they face is undoubtedly determined by the variables studied in the literature, it proves difficult to apply the "wisdom" of this field of study, for several reasons. First of all, the aggregate data (used for example in studies related to the resource subsystem) do not represent the subnational realities facing peace activists working on the grassroot level. Only a few privileged planners on the national and international level can benefit from the knowledge that more tourism means less conflicts: and to begin with, people do not join tours for the sake of peace. Secondly, the peaceless variables included in the information subsystem tend - with important exceptions - to focus on governments and on the decision-makers. Excellent studies are made about how misunderstanding is generated in inter-state relations, but no studies are made as to how grassroot level action groups can establish crosscultural communications among themselves. Thirdly, and this is what matters most, peace practitioners always deal with concrete events. They face not imperialism but a specific case of exploitation, they do not fight against a variable e.g. "coercive control", but work to liberate political prisonners. In brief, it is necessary to relate better the knowledge about the peaceless system with the practice in peaceless situations.16)

In trying to do so, we immediately face another problem. There are so many seemingly unrelated situations that we do not know how to deal with them. How can we meaningfully relate such dissimilar peaceless situations as the nuclear arms race among superpowers, and an ethnic conflict in an Asian village? If no relation does in fact exist, we had better stopped talking about peacelessness as a global phenomenon. All the peace agents engaged in their particular situations should not be bothered by strangers dealing with unrelated peaceless events.

The truth of the matter is, however, that such is not the case in the present day world where peaceless situations tend more and more to be interrelated. Today, the following three trends pervade all parts of the world:

1) Technological developments make the exploitation of resources a more and more globally organized enterprise.

2) The increase in the global volume of communication and transaction is breaking the barriers of traditionally closed cultural units.

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16) Such discommunication between peace practitioners and peace researchers is not only due to the relative lack of relevance of the latter's studies. One important peace education problem is to train practitioners in the use of analytic thinking.

3) The power structures in the world tend to be more powerful at the top, but meet a growing pressure from counter-power centers at the bottom.

As a consequence of the first trend, the regional and transnational organization of economic operations (e.g. the activities of multi-national corporations) does not permit conflicts about resource allocation to stay localized. Any conflict tends to spill over either geographically or in terms of the different sectors of the economy.

The second trend helps the propagation of new values through the various communication channels (nationalism, demand for participation, human rights, modernization, etc.). This raises the basic value expectations on the one hand, and creates conflicts between the traditional and emerging value systems (e.g. Western activism vs. traditional Oriental contemplative values). In consequence, there is a tendency for conflicting values to be propagated cross-culturally.

The growing complexity of the power structures tends to link together different peaceless events and situations because power competitors try to build a stronger position through coalitions and by linking the different issues faced by their clients. An example is the escalation of the Vietnam War, where a nationalistic issue is linked to a Cold War conflict.

It is, therefore, more and more difficult to understand what is happening in a particular peaceless situation unless one knows how it is related to others. This is why it becomes imperative to determine the interrelationship between those situations and the peaceless variables, since only through the latter can the spill-over, the propagation and the linking among the former be satisfactorily analyzed.

As a first approximation, we can look at the interrelationship among the different peaceless situations, as we show in Tables 1 through 3.

We distinguish here, quite tentatively, thirteen situations; 1) Super Power Competition (SPC), 2) Environment Destruction (END), 3) Multinational Corporations'unregulated Activities (MNC), 4) East-West Conflicts (EWC), 5) North-South Conflicts (NSC), 6) Conventional Wars and Arms Race (WAR), 7) Oppressive Rules and Human Rights Infringement (OPR), 8) Maldistribution of Resources and Economic-Political Iniquity (MDI), 9) Racial Discrimination and Ethnic Conflicts (RDI), 10) Urban Industrial Conflicts (UIC), 11) Rural Agrarian Conflicts (RAC), 12) Value Conflicts (VAC), and 13) Generation Gaps (GEG). As indicated in Table 1, the peaceless situations are classified according to the eight levels on

which they manifest themselves. We can identify intuitively the relationships indicated in Table 1. Whether they exist really or not is an empirical question which requires scientific investigation.

Table 2 indicates the hypothetical bases of these relationships according to whether they are caused predominantly by (1) spill-over on the resource level, (2) propagation on the communication level, (3) linkages on the power level.

In the Table 3, we indicate together with the factors playing a predominant role in each situation, the peace agents expected to work to transform the situations into more peaceful ones. We also indicate peace research theories which can provide bases for the analysis of the situations as well as the basic skills to be developed through peace education.

The Table 3 is meant to indicate the ties which link the different kinds of peace agents, and the close relations between peace research and peace education. It can become a starting point for further investigation into a transnational coordination which we advocate in the next section.

4. Where Research and Education Meet

We come, at last, to the major point we want to make in this article. If local peaceless situations are becoming more closely related to each other every day, it is impossible to work efficiently to cope with the problems in one of them without having someone deal with the problems of the related situations. This requires the cooperation of the peace agents involved in different situations as well as that of the peace researchers who should clarify the role played by the intervening peaceless variables.

A sharing of value concepts, exchange of information about the objective conditions of peacelessness, and consultation about the strategies to be adopted vis-à-vis the power structures is essential for peace research as well as for peace action. This is why peace education and research must be viewed as two sides of a same coin, i.e. the transnational effort where everybody tries to complete his own knowledge about the peaceless situation by learning from those who face different but closely related situations. In this context, the term peace research may be used to emphasize the joint research aspect, and peace education to stress the mutual learning aspect.

With such a perspective we must initiate a peace research-education program which takes into account the following points:

1) Priority must be given to the mutual learning, i.e. research and education, process among the peace agents in different peaceless situations about the different value aspirations. This is crucial for reaching a common understanding about the pluralistic aspect of global peacelessness. It is also a precondition for cooperation among the peace actors who otherwise cannot understand how they can and why they should cooperate with people with motivations apparently alien to theirs. On the research level, it is necessary to develop cross-cultural communication studies about how the different value vocabularies can be translated into other cultural contexts. On the education level, the creation of an attitude open to value pluralism not only intellectually but also in affective terms must be developed. A combination of conscientization aimed at finding by oneself one's own values and of dialogue where one listens to others attentively to understand and empathize with others' values has to be used. 17)

2) An exchange of factual information among the peace agents engaged in different peaceless situations has to be organized systematically so as to find the diffusion, spillover, and linkages among different peacelessness situations. Only by cooperation among the peace agents of different categories - such as peace activists on the grassroot level, peace oriented international organizations, and peace researchers of different disciplines - will it be possible to ascertain how these factors are interrelated, and where lies

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17) A concrete way of organizing dialogues among groups of peace agents working in entirely different situations might be to use an "open-ended dialogue" method. Each group would first discuss among themselves such key topics as "violence" or "how to cope with human rights infringements". The debate would be content analyzed and major themes would be detected, and a list of which could be exchanged so that the groups could find how other peace agents perceive the same problem. They might then have a second discussion, comparing their values and approaches with those of others, sending back to the groups a list of comments and questions to help clarify the reasons why they disagree on some points. Such an exchange of themes, corrected themes, and questionning themes could be content analyzed in such a way as to show a kind of tree structure of the themes shared or contested. This exercise could in this way serve both the purpose of mutual education and communication research.

the weak point in the whole peacelessness system. 18) In educational terms, this means that it is necessary to train peace agents to be able to see those interrelations on the structural level and understand the underlying factors which work for or against the maintenance of those relationships on the analytic level.

This is an especially difficult task for peace education, given the already mentioned tendency of the practitioners to be interested only in the situational aspects whereas researchers look only at the systemic aspects. The difference between the people working on the international level and with a legalistic and programatic approach, and the grassroot activists who focus on immediate solutions of burning issues must also be bridged through education.

3) The third problem concerns organizing the various activities of the peace agents so as to produce an optimal change in the various parts of the global situation of peacelessness. Here peace research must become the policy science of the powerless; studying the decision-making and negotiation processes on the grassroot action group level. How such groups can communicate with each other and devise joint strategies is a problem at least as important as that of how nations negotiate and make their decisions. On the peace education level, peace agents must learn from each other techniques - in nonviolent social change for example - they have developed in their respective situations..Even if they may not be in a position to employ others' techniques, a good understanding helps avoid unnecessary strains among peace agents. For example, if a member of the UN peacekeeping force meets nonviolent demonstrators, it is better

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18) In an informal meeting on human rights organized by the Committee on Society, Development, and Peace (SODEPAX) in Geneva (December, 1971) the representatives of different non-governmental organizations concerned with this issue agreed on the need to coordinate their operation, not only on the international level but also on the national or local grassroot level, to detect human rights infringements, and to cope with them. It was pointed out that there should be established a list of all the organizations concerned, together with the resources they had and the local activities they could perform; and a manual taking into account the legal procedures as well as the psychological, social, and political factors hindering or helping the activities of the human rights protectors was proposed as a means to help local activists.

that he realizes how his role is related to theirs. 19)

4) Peace research, peace education, and peace actions must be linked into a dynamic process - as represented in the diagram of Figure 1. 20). The basis of this process must be the initiatives of the peace agents. Peace research has to put them in a larger context of the global peacelessness, analyze the situation, and propose how the efforts made in different situations can be coordinated in order to cope with the overall peacelessness.

A concrete plan for coordinated action thus emerges. Its realization requires the self-education of the peace agents: activists and researchers. New values must be grasped and new skills developed. The result of this peace education phase should be reported back to the grassroot level or to any other levels where open criticism should sharpen the results and strengthen the initiatives of the peace agents.

5. Conclusion

We have stressed the necessity of organizing peace research and peace education into a transnational network.

Obviously, such a large-scale operation cannot be realized overnight. What is important is to bear in mind this long-range program, and start to build partial networks wherever possible. Even where transnational exchanges are unpracticable for lack of means or because of political obstacles, one must be prepared to open communication as soon as this becomes possible. Such openness must form part of all peace research projects and peace education programs. Too closed and self sufficient systems, whether in research

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19) In this respect the approach used by the Peace Academy during its summer program in Finland (1971) is very useful, since it gave an occasion for the peacekeepers - the members of the UN Peace Keeping Forces, the peacemakers - the diplomats, and the peacebuilders - the non-violent activists, to come together and discuss common problems as well as difference of their value positions.

20) The diagram is applied from Shoichi Nakai's committee logic, a method of making decisions which avoids the alienating process usually accompanying this operation. Cf. Shoichi Nakai, Ronri to sono Jissen (Logic and its actualization), Tokyo, 1972, pp. 286-298.

or in education, tend to force away outside interlocutors who cannot find their place in them.

The above partial measures - and many others as well - should be taken in preparation of the global network, which in the due course can become a counterveiling influence against the global network which reinforce peacelessness throughout the world.


PEACE EDUCATION
Value Acquisition
Skill Development
Concrete Action
PEACE RESEARCH
Contextualisation
Analysis
Action Proposal
PEACE AGENT
Initiative
Critique and
Revision
Deeper Self-
Education
Deeper Research
New
Initiative
Critique

Figure 1.

Level	Peaceless Situations	Linkage among peaceless situations
Gobal	Superpower competition	
	Environment destruction	
Trans-national	Multi-national corporation	
Inter-regional	East-West conflicts	
	North-South conflicts	
Inter-national	Conventional wars and arms race	
National	Oppressive rule & Human rights	
	Maldistri-bution & inequity	
Sub-national	Racial dis-crimination, ethnic con-flicts	
Local	Urban indus-trial conflicts	
	Rural agrarian conflicts	
Individual	Value conflicts Generation gaps	



Table 1.

	SPC	END	MNC	EWC	NSC	WAR	OPR	MDI	RDI	UIC	RAC	VAC	GEG
SPC		-	-	L.	L.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
END			S.L.	-	-	-	-	-	-	S.	-	P.	P.
MNC				-	S.	-	-	-	-	S.L.	S.L.	P.	P.
EWC					L.	L.	L.	-	-	-	-	P.L.	-
NSC						L.	S.L.	S.	P.L.	P.L.	P.L.	P.L.	-
WAR							L.	-	-	-	-	P.L.	-
OPR								P.L.	L.	L.	L.	P.L.	P.L.
MDI									S.L.	S.L.	S.L.	P.L.	P.L.
RDI										P.L.	P.L.	P.L.	-
UIC											P.L.	P.L.	P.L.
RAC												P.L.	P.L.
VAC													P.
GEG													

Table 2

Level		Predominant Factors	Peace Agents	Peace Research	Peace Education
1.Global	Superpower competition	P.	O(1),M(3) P(3),E(2)	PD,RP CR,DC	PM,PK
	Environment destruction	R.	O(5),P(1,4) E(6)	FU,SA	PB
2.Trans-national	Multi-national corporations	R.P.	O(2),P(2,4)	IO,RT IM	PB
3.Inter-regional	East-West conflicts	P.C.	O(3),M(3) P(1),E(2)	PD,RP,DC CR,TT,IR	PM,PK
	North-South conflicts	R.P.	O(3,4,5), M(3),P(1),E(3,6)	RT,TT SA,IM	PB,PM
4.Inter-national	Conventional wars and arms race	P.	O(2),M(3) P(3),E(4)	CR,RT DM,RP DC,TR	PK,PM
5.National	Oppressive rule & human rights	P.	O(5,2),P(1.2) E(5,6)	RT,CP DC,PO	PB
	Maldistr.& inequity	P.R.	O(4,5),P(4) E(5,6)	RT,IM	PB
6.Sub-national	Racial dis-crimination	C.P.	O(2,4),P(1,2) E(5,6)	DC,IR	PB
	Ethnic con-flict	C.P.	O(4,5),M(5) E(6)	DC,IR	PM,PB
7.Local	Urban in-dustrial conflicts	R.C.	O(5.6),M(6) P(4),E(6)	FU,SA RT,DC	PB,PM
	Rural agra-rian conflicts	R.P.	O(5,6),M(6) P(4),E(6)	FU,SA RT,DC	PB,PM
8.Indivi-dual	Value conflicts	C.	O(1,2.6) M(5.6),E(5,6.7)	IR,PO	PM
	Generation gaps	C.	O(1,2 ..6) M(5.6),E(5.6.7)	IR,PO	PM

R = Resources
C = Communic.
P = Power

O = Organizers
M = Mediators
P = Planners
E = Educators

PD=Prisoners Dilemma
RP=Richardson Processes
CR=Conflict Resolution
DC=Dimensions of Conflict
FU=Future World Order Models
SA=Systems Anal.
IO=Internat.Org.
RT=Rank Theory
IM=Imperialism
TT=Transaction Theory

PK=Peace Keeping
PM=Peace Making
PB=Peace Building

IR=Image Resear.
CP=Comparative Politics
PO=Public Opinion
DM=Decision-Mak.

Table 3.

SAUL H. MENDLOVITZ and THOMAS WEISS (USA)

A FRAMEWORK FOR THE POLICY STUDIES OF GLOBAL PEACE AND JUSTICE

I do not wish to seem overdramatic but I can only conclude from the information that is available to me as Secretary-General, that the members of the United Nations have perhaps ten years left in which to subordinate their ancient quarrels and launch a global partnership to curb the arms race, to improve the human environment, to defuse the population explosion, and to supply the required momentum to development efforts.

If such a global partnership is not forged within the next decade, then I very much fear that the problems I have mentioned will have reached such staggering proportions that they will be beyond our capacity to control.

U THANT, 1969.

We must remember that the only time in the history of the world that we have had any extended periods of peace is when there has been a balance of power. It is when one nation becomes infinitely more powerful in relation to its potential competitor that the danger of war arises. So I believe in a world in which the United States is powerful. I think it will be a safer world and a better world if we have a strong, healthy United States, Europe, Soviet Union, China, Japan, each balancing the other, not playing one against the other, an even balance.

..... Richard M. Nixon, 1972.

Introduction

Our assignment in this brief article is to indicate what we believe to be a framework for the policy studies of global peace and justice. We intend to pursue that assignment in a rather straightforward, in fact almost "naive realism" fashion. That is to say, we shall not concern ourselves with a host of subtle, important and relatively complicated questions which academicians and sophisticated political activists would prefer be clarified, given the intellectual and political difficulties of such an assignment. We will not for example, explore the issue of whether "ideas are the switchmen" of history, i.e., what is the relationship of ideas to action. The question of whether there is a uni-causal frame of reference for understanding war or a multi frame of reference will also be glossed over. Nor will there be a major discussion of the extent to which counter-intuitive behavioral systems analyses are needed for an understanding of our present circumstances.

And finally, by way of illustration, we will not explicate a philosophy of history and, at least consciously, will avoid subscribing for the moment at least, to any particular intellectual or ideological position on the nature of human society.

Having made these disclaimers, we nevertheless wish to make clear that we are aware that all of these matters are very much in fact woven into our exposition. We are very much aware that one cannot avoid taking positions on the issues raised by these questions. Nor do we wish to. However we hope to perform a service, which while recognizing the complexities of the issues raised above, nevertheless bypasses them, in the sense that our "naive realism" will provide a comprehensive but guiding frame of reference for those interested in achieving global peace and social justice.

And because one must begin somewhere, we wish to initiate our discussion with the two quotations which introduce this article, and again in a simple fashion.

First we wish to indicate our agreement with the position taken by former Secretary-General U Thant in 1969. We believe there is a set of global problems and that we have a decade to begin to make some substantial progress in dealing with it or otherwise they "will have reached such staggering proportions that they will be beyond our capacity to control". Secondly, in some sense this article and frame of reference presented here, attempt to provide an evaluative frame of reference for the statement made by the President of the United States in 1972. That is, we want to know whether the image of a five power balance of power world for the latter part of the 20th century seems sufficient, adequate, fair and just, to deal with the problems presented by U Thant. We would urge all individuals concerned, either as academicians or as political activists, to see the questions posed by U Thant, and the solution provided by President Nixon, as the underlying world order issue of the next five years. For it is a basic principle of this frame of reference that it is essential for large numbers of individuals throughout the world to begin to produce more humane and compassionate visions of the global world order than that proposed by President Nixon.

The underlying premise for this paper is that during the past two decades there has been an increasing number of responsible-thoughtful-progressive individuals and groups throughout the globe, who have come to understand that the human race faces a set of global problems that threaten the survival of the human race, and raise serious doubt as to whether or not we will be able to provide a tolerable quality of life style for all human beings. Furthermore, like U Thant, many of these individuals feel that these problems must be dealt with rapidly and systematically. In addition, they are in possession of much of the data underlying U Thant's statement, and per-

haps it might be sensible, just for the purposes of a common set of data, to present some of the figures which the former Secretary-General must have had in mind.

The armaments race, which accounted for 100 billion dollars of the world economic system in 1963, now costs well over 200 billion dollars, and by the end of the '70's is likely to consume over 300 billion dollars. Furthermore, it is likely that a minimum of three and as many as six other nation-states will have joined the club of nuclears. To select but one item among the many troublesome trends that threaten our environment: Using 1950 as a base line, conservative estimates indicate that the carbon monoxide in our atmosphere will increase a minimum of 15% by the year 2000, with effects, while not yet clearly understood, likely to have very severe if not tragic consequences for human society. Human population: having increased from one billion to two billion between the period 1830-1930, to 3.3 billion by 1971 and with a very high probability of reaching 5.8 billion by the year 2000, suggests a host of problems with regard to welfare, development, social justice, authority processes and the outbreak of violence. Finally, again utilizing conservative estimates: presently the twenty to twenty-five most developed states have a per capita income which is twelve to fourteen times as great as the other 120 states; this gap is likely to increase to twenty to one by the year 2000, with, it should also be noted, 50% of the projected population of six billion probably no better off than they are today, namely living on $ 100 to $ 125 per capita income. It is likely that the lower 10%, i.e., 600 million people will be living on $ 50 per capita income.

These figures are of course straight line projections and not only do not reveal the dynamics of the social processes which propel the projections, but give no clue to the kinds of social programming which will be necessary if we are to avoid the potential catastrophe these numbers suggest.

As we suggested above, we believe that this set of problems is well known to responsible-thoughtful-progressive individuals throughout the globe. Furthermore, we believe that many of them are working on remedies to solve these problems. As we see it however, there has been no consensus either on the world we wish to achieve or on a strategy of transition for achieving that world. On some other occasion we hope to spell out our ideas on these two questions. Here however, we have a much less ambitious purpose. We would like to provide a frame of reference so that all persons interested in these problems would recognize their availability and common understanding to like minded people throughout the world. And to provide then a systematic way for these like minded individuals to carry on disussion and initiate processes that will bring about remedies for the questions posed by U Thant, and introduce a global political system for the realization of world order values. We shall provide below a formal defi-

nition and matrix for this frame of reference, but it seems appropriate to say just a few more words about our "naive realism".

As we see it, war, social injustice, poverty and ecocide (in which we include the notions of pollution, resource depletion and over-population) are phenomena which the vast bulk of mankind has participated in and accomodated to throughout its recorded history. Humanity has, in other words, considered these matters to be "in the nature of things".

Foremost amongst these is the institution of war. It is still a conviction widely held throughout the world that war, springing from aggressive impulses in man, is an inevitable and enduring institution of human society. The pervasiveness of this conviction does not seem to be diminished by the fact that scientific data tend to undermine the belief that large-scale organized violence is a necessary outgrowth of the aggressive impulses experienced by the human species. Perhaps we should note here that our understanding of the human mind and social psychology leads toward the conclusion that while man may be an aggressive animal, his aggressive impulses may take various forms, many of which are actually constructive in ways probably indispensable to the future of civilization.

Furthermore we should note that the attempt to eliminate war as an institution--rather than merely to diminish its horror and brutality--is of relatively recent vintage. The League of Nations aside (since neither the United States nor a large number of other states ever were members), it can be said fairly that the first major attempt to outlaw war was to be found in the Kellogg-Briand pact of 1927, where for the first time in the history of mankind, the leaders of the majority of nation-states which had the capacity to initiate international wars, renounced war as an instrument of national policy. In 1945 the creation of the United Nations, building on the League of Nations and the Kellogg-Briand pact, represented an even more significant commitment to outlawing war. Nevertheless it is true that the United Nations has had only the most modest success over the first twenty-five years of its existence. The present world political system, dominated by individual nation-states, states which refuse to surrender sovereignty on matters concerning their own security, now bears within itself the threat of such large scale violence that the institution of war has emerged as one of the great survival problems of mankind.

Here we now wish to state a fundamental thesis, but not give it the benefit of full argument. It is our position that poverty, social injustice and ecocide are inseparable from the future of war. That in fact, these four problems must now generally be recognized as worldwide problems. To be sure, each of these problems has to some extent, different natural histories in civilizations. Today however, in the contemporary world, they stand out as a set of interrelated crucial

problems which must be solved. In fact they constitute a systemic crisis of the greatest magnitude.

So that our own biases might be made clear, we should like to add a few more introductory remarks concerning what we consider to be the most significant social processes of the modern era. During the last few centuries two revolutions, the scientific-technological and egalitarian-ideological, have brought these problems to an explosive global point. The incredible growth and tempo of the technological revolution has made it possible for one or more nation-states, acting on its own authority, to destroy much of mankind in minutes' time. Furthermore it is increasingly clear that the revolutions in energy, computers and bio-chemistry will open up problems, challenges and opportunities for which the world is at the moment very much unprepared.

The explosion of egalitarian ideologies into mass consciousness has led to an unprecedented situation in which demands for justice and improved conditions of material well-being are being made with ever-increasing insistence. The prolonged inability of nations to control the burgeoning world population, to moderate the race between the depletion of resources and the long term achievement of universal welfare and ecological stability, to control the eruption into violence of newborn and ancient rivalries and tensions, and to achieve minimal standards of social justice, is leading to the breakdown of structures of authority, and continued widespread pervasive suffering.

Despite these processes we wish to make clear that we believe it is within the grasp of mankind to eliminate war as a human social institution and to provide tolerable conditions of economic welfare, social justice and ecological stability. We would remind the reader that human sacrifice, cannibalism and slavery are human institutions which at one time or another existed in many societies throughout the globe, but it now seems clear that they are unlikely to reenter global society within the foreseeable future. The history of their elimination is extremely complex, and we will therefore not rehearse here the lessons to be learned from that history. What we do wish to suggest however, is that the four problems we have referred to are of no greater magnitude than those institutions which have already been eliminated, and that with appropriate social action--that means political mobilization based on understanding of political processes--it will be possible to accomplish this task.

Again we wish to make clear that we do not consider what has been said thus far to be particularly novel. Some readers may consider it to be controversial and a smaller number (hopefully) may even consider the presentation silly. What we are trying to do here however, is to provide a primer that points the way to deal with the global problems. Once this is done, our hope would be that a sufficient critical mass of

individuals and groups throughout the world would mobilize themselves for the discussion and ensuing political action necessary to change the present system of international relations.

Definition of World Order

We present now a definition and methodology for the policy studies of global peace and justice. We have used the term "world order" instead of peace and justice, for we feel that that term more easily comprehends all the global problems which have now come to be understood as significant for achieving survival and an adequate standard of life for common humanity. But we have no disagreement with those who would prefer to use the term "peace and justice".

World Order is used here to designate that study of international relations and world affairs which focuses primarily on the questions of how to reduce significantly the likelihood of international violence and to create tolerable conditions of worldwide economic welfare, social justice and ecological stability. In more connotative but less precise terminology the question reads, how to achieve and maintain a warless and more just world and improve the quality of human life.

So understood, the substantive matters comprehended by world order are a range of actors--world institutions, international organizations, regional arrangements, transnational actors, the nation-state, infra-national groups, and the individual--as they relate to the following dimensions of world political and community processes: peace-keeping, third party resolution of disputes and other modes of pacific settlement, disarmament and arms control, economic development and welfare, the technological and scientific revolutions, ecological stability, and human and social rights.

Methodologically, the inquiry involves the use of relevant utopias culminating in the statement of the investigator's preferred world.

A <u>relevant utopia</u> consists in projecting a reasonably concrete behavioral model or image of a system of world political and social processes capable of preventing organized international violence and providing adequate worldwide economic welfare, social justice and ecological stability, <u>and</u> a similarly concrete behavioral statement of transition from the present system to the model. Operationally, the use of relevant utopias also involves an analysis of the present system of world political and social processes as they relate to these problems. In addition, relevant utopias must describe in as rigorous a manner as possible, the trends and prognoses

with respect to these problems over a one to three decade period. (Within this context relevance means that both the model and the transition must be sufficiently described in behavioral terms so that the intelligent reader as well as the formulator has a reasonable basis for making a statement about the probabilities of the emergence of such a model. It does not mean that the model or utopia is politically feasible).

Transition involves describing how the present system is likely to and/or will be transformed to the projected model or image. In dealing with transition, special emphasis is given to the possibility of system change absent or without recourse to large-scale violence.

A preferred world is a blueprint of a recommended structure, and recommended guidelines and steps for achieving that structure in order to maximize world order values, described again in reasonably concrete behavioral terms. It is from testing alternative world order models and transition processes, structures and strategies (that is from a set of relevant utopias) that the investigator is able to select or invent from various facets of these relevant utopias, his preferred world.

Throughout the inquiry formalized authoritative structures and processes of world legal order are given special emphasis, especially as they relate to relevant political, economic and social processes and structures which militate for and against achieving and maintaining the underlying community of a warless, more just and ecologically stable world.

Finally, a continuous effort needs to be made to state operational definition(s) of "world interest" in terms of the central problems.

MATRIX FOR THE STUDY OF WORLD ORDER

World Values with Minimal-Maximal Range

Inter-Actor Violence	(minimization of violence - to - prevention of violence)
Economic Welfare	(creation of tolerable conditions - to - maintenance of prosperity)
Social Justice	(creation of tolerable conditions - to - maintenance of human dignity)
World Ecological Balance	(restoration of balance - to - preservation of balance)
Participation	(Positive self -identity - to - active involvement in achievement of a preferred world system)

Achievement Scale
1 (low) - 5 (high)

Substantive Dimensions (processes) →		Arms Policy	Peace-keeping	Conflict Resolution	Economic Welfare	Techno-logical & Scien-tific Rev.	Environment	Social Justice
Dimension Elements →								
World Actors* (Structures) ↓	Year							
World	1970							
	1980							
	1990							
	2000							
International	1970							
	1980							
	1990							
	2000							
Regional	1970							
	1980							
	1990							
	2000							
Trans-national	1970							
	1980							
	1990							
	2000							
Nation-State	1970							
	1980							
	1990							
	2000							
Infra-national	1970							
	1980							
	1990							
	2000							
Individual	1970							
	1980							
	1990							
	2000							

*Social Movements, Institutions, Organizations

March 1970

Professor of International Law, Rutgers University

Saul H. Mendlovitz
Director, World Order Models Project, World Law Fund

A number of points should be made concerning the relationship between the Matrix and the Definition before we continue our exposition. First it should be noted that both in the Introduction and in the Definition, four problems were identified, whereas in the Matrix we have identified five values. This leads to the point that, while we are isolating problems, our response to them is not in terms of "solutions", but as human values to be realized. That is to say, we prefer to use the term "values" which has a dynamic and process oriented connotation, rather than the term "solutions" which seems to us to be too definitive and static, and insufficiently open for continuing change.

Second, the Matrix identifies participation as a fifth value, albeit it is not listed as one of the problems. This apparent discrepancy stems from the fact that a goodly number of individuals conceive of participation to be a part of the problem of social injustice for the value of social justice. However in our own work we have concluded that participation is such an important ethical and pragmatic component in the construction of viable global political society that we wish to isolate it and give it the significance and dignity which we have given to the other problems.

It should also be noted that while the time periods shown in the Matrix run from the decade 1970 to the year 2000, there is theoretically no reason why this particular frame of reference could not be utilized to review, analyse and evaluate all of recorded history, past and future, albeit the data would not always be available for the various epochs. But here we wish to make another bias very clear. We feel that most of the contemporary work done in futurology has failed abysmally in dealing with discontinuity, let alone the possibility that man may shape his own future. We would urge individuals concerned with global peace and justice therefore to try as much as possible to wrench themselves from history; to provide scenarios of the future which would be actual guidelines for our political behavior in the contemporary world. It is this shaping of the future towards which the entire frame of reference is pointed.

Some Additional Problems of Studying Global Peace and Justice

We turn now to some additional items involved in the Definition and Matrix.

1. Initially, it is important to note that international relations and world affairs have been conjoined in the first paragraph of the Definition. This formulation recognizes that in the images put forward by social scientists and decision makers, the nation-state system is still the central dynamic process of world politics. It is our view that it would be impossible to consider the present global system without taking into account the nation-state system. Nevertheless

we do feel that that system is no longer a sufficiently accurate empirical depiction of today's world, and, as we shall argue below, it is less likely to be so in the long run.

2. Our next point reiterates the argument which was made in the Introduction, namely that this framework for peace and justice is problem-solving and value realizing in its orientation. And at this juncture at least does not seek to put forward a global ideological position. The important point is that all responsible-progressive people around the world have now recognized these four problems as crucial to global survival and tolerable quality of life style.

One additional fundamental point should be made here. Solutions to these problems do not necessarily imply global institutions. The problem-resolving networks can be communal, local, national, transnational, regional or global. Furthermore it should be clearly understood that the lines between domestic, transnational, regional and global no longer have the heuristic value political scientists and activists made of them in an earlier period. In fact there is now an interpenetration of these various arenas. The fundamental realization is that the responsibility is worldwide and that the fate of all men is tied to finding appropriate human value resolutions.

3. In order to use the framework for world order effectively two additional points need to be made concerning the global problems and world order values. First we must find operational standards for what we consider to be the problem resolution in each area. Secondly and just as important, there must be a recognition which goes to a systematic methodology of the organic relationship which exists among the various problems. Let us look first at the operationalizing of standards for each of the areas.

An operational standard demands that one move beyond slogans and start to develop workable, action-oriented criteria. It is our contention that these matters are capable of being defined in more precise terms than has hitherto been the case. Begin for example, with the problem of violence. As an initial matter we must decide how to delineate the phenomena we shall decide to investigate. Thus the fact that some 150.000 people are killed and some six to seven million are injured on world highways annually, is a matter of world concern, but for reasons which remain at the moment commonsensical and intuitive, we would argue that it is not a world order concern, that is here our "naive realism" comes to the fore.

Put in another way, we would begin our delineation of the problem of violence with the rule which is already in existence now, that the threat of the use of force by one state against another is sufficient to invoke world community response. What we have in mind is that large scale violence

of the classic form, i.e. when one governmental bureaucracy calls for a member of its military staff to cross a national boundary, it matters not whether one or one million casualties result, only that in such a situation the world community must respond.

Nevertheless, while focusing initially on the existing rule, and having excluded 150.000 automobile fatalities, we believe that "naive realism" in world order theory would lead most men of good will and common sense to the view that the world community should intervene in a large number of instances of violence which are ordinarily considered to be within the domestic jurisdiction. The doctrine of non-interference, when such doctrine leads to the carnage of somewhere between 200.000 and 600.000 people being savagely brutalized and murdered in Indonesia, Somaliland, Bangladesh, Burundi and Nigeria,raises the question if existing definitions and methods of dealing with large scale violence and war prevention are sensible, let alone morally acceptable, for the world community. Are there some conceptions of humanitarian intervention or modified peacekeeping or some other doctrine which the world community might utilize to prevent such horrors?

4. What do we mean by a concern with "economic welfare"? We would remind you of the data given at the beginning indicating the gap between the underdeveloped and developed areas of the world. Here we would ask the question: Is it possible to speak of really solving global problems with the existence of this projected gap, if we do not provide the bottom 10% of the world population with some minimal standard, let us say $ 300 - $ 400 per capita? Does this imply a maximal standard? Furthermore, answers to these questions of per capita income are only part of the operational standard for economic welfare. One must not only consider a redistribution of income, but also measures to insure access to work, education and medical care, etc. And perhaps more fundamental than that, is there some notion of economic welfare which is tied to the realization of each human being, and therefore melds into the notion of social justice?

5. Operationalizing "social justice" is perhaps the most difficult task. Many are asking for a universal writ of habeas corpus, or about the position of demands by women for equality, or liberalizing drug laws. While it seems extremely difficult to agree upon a total definition of social justice, one area does seem to have emerged very clearly for world community action.

With one notable exception in professed creed, i.e. South Africa, --and a relatively large number of lamentable notable exceptions in practice, and here the reader may make his own list of exceptions-- it is still nevertheless true that the entire world community has agreed that discrimination based on race is outrageous. Our hope would be that this outrage will mobilize large numbers of people and that by acting on

such a clearly emerged criterion, other criteria of social justice will become generally acceptable over time.

6. Ecological balance connotes varying images to various people. Again we would refer to the data used in connection with U Thant's statement. Here we would only add that operational standards, unlike social justice, are easily measurable. That does not mean that the ecological system does not involve a very complex set of interrelated problems, but it does mean that more or less objective standards are capable of being realized.

7. The reader should recall that our second aim is to instill our analysis of peace and justice with a thorough understanding of the organic relationship between the four problem areas. This discussion will bypass the cause/effect relationship between war and underlying conditions of society, although we recognize the validity of such a debate. Rather, our approach contends that in order to think of one problem area, one must immediately talk about all the others. Operationally, this means that for example at the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm in the summer of 1972, it was eminently sensible that talk about pollution and resource depletion was related to discussion of disarmament and development. Or, when discussions are held about not crossing national boundaries as a method of delimiting violence, the subject of white minorities must also be included. Put in another way, it is necessary to determine the kind of violence which can be sanctioned in order to reverse the structural violence within the unacceptable racist system of South Africa. One standard results from considering that black life expectancy is 45-50 years, and that of their white counterparts is 70 years. How much legitimate violence under what groups and under what authority can be used to topple that white regime in order to narrow the gap between these statistics? While life expectancy is a number and therefore easy to deal with, similar questions must be asked in relationship to access to education or the general quality of black life. Any program or analysis of peace and justice must come to grips then with the interrelationship between the four values.

8. Our commentary now turns to those actors participating in the solution of the interrelated problems of war, poverty, social injustice and ecocide. Two points are necessary to make. First, it is necessary to emphasize the range of actors. Much discussion of the problems of peace and justice still uses the terminology appropriate to international law, which as we noted above seems increasingly irrelevant due to underlying political processes. Second, by focusing on all actors which exist between the individual and world institutions, we attempt to remain flexible and utilize the full range of actors. Thus, when a nation-state can accomplish a necessary portion of a strategy for peace and justice, why not utilize it? At other times, when trans-

national or world community inputs are more appropriate in problem solving, the nation-state system should be de-emphasized. Furthermore it is our own conviction that transnational groupings will become increasingly important and provide a solid basis for system transforming processes which will help resolve global problems. Our own view here is that the scientific, business, communication, artistic and church communities are likely to be the movers in transnational groupings demanding major basic change in the global political system.

9. A brief word needs to be said about the substantive dimensions which have been identified, and which we would hope that behavioral scientists and political activists would work with. These substantive dimensions again, are neither novel nor particularly insightful. In fact it is their very lack of novelty, and their commonplaceness which make them sensible for us to include in the Matrix. That is to say, it provides us with a sense of common agenda on which we should all be working over the next few decades.

10. The meaning of relevant utopia leads to an important methodological point. Most simply, it is a concrete description of what a particular world would look like at some future time, and a trend analysis in similarly concrete terms of how that particular system would be realized. To make the point even more starkly, no utopia is irrelevant because it appears to be politically impossible. Any utopia is relevant which describes in specific behavior the process by which world political system could be brought into being.

Our reason for insisting on reviewing the range of relevant utopias stems from the fact that despite the consensus on global problems, there are no universal standards either for the world we wish to achieve, or the method of getting there. It is then of crucial significance that as many individuals throughout the world as possible become involved in describing a desired world and the steps to get there, for this will undoubtedly be one of the great learning mechanisms for transforming the system. Furthermore, we--unlike the behavioral scientist interested primarily in concretization and prediction--want to be influenced by all possible views so that the final universal decisional standards will be more generally acceptable.

Reviewing the range of relevant utopias is not sufficient however, since too many past academic analysts have presented trends and facts without stating a policy preference and defending it. The component of a preferred world necessitates a value judgment by selecting from the total range of utopias and making a commitment to the operationalization of the preferred one.

11. A few words about the role of law in facilitating peace and justice, or world order, as we have come to call it, seem appropriate. It is now evident that radicalism,

whether reactionary or progressive, will continue to be important in both domestic and international politics. What has not yet been made clear is that the development of world authority --world law--is in fact a radical notion. We are so accustomed to thinking of radicalism in terms of revolution against authority that we have failed to realize that the demand for world authority is itself radical. Our own speculations lead us to believe that the problems of the '70's and '80's--war, population, hunger, race relations, pollution of the environment, urban sprawl, and the new set of problems arising from automation, interplanetary explorations, microbiology and eugenics, to mention but a few of the more salient possibilities, are so fraught with the potential for large-scale social disorganization, that it may very well be precisely those individuals who have in the past been attracted to radicalism and revolution who will be the ones to demand of their government a more rational world system than the present one.

Put in another way, it might be argued that law is almost a universal experience, and can be appealed to as a rational method for achieving peace and justice. To be sure, law has sometimes operated both oppressively and ineffectively, and these are good reasons for many people to be suspicious of and hostile to solutions based on legal institutions. These are however not objections to law itself, but to its substantive content or a particular form of its application. Aside from a very few philosophical anarchists, most reasonable people, and this includes revolutionaries and victims of oppression, envision a world in which proper law is used to control violence, resolve conflicts, redress harms, and promote social justice. In short, law as a method and goal for a world peace and justice movement, makes sense to the people of the world.

12. We have left until last a discussion of transition, admittedly the most difficult and therefore in some ways the weakest aspect of peace and justice analyses. We are specifically asking: Now that the four problems have been identified as important, what can each of us as individuals or organized as groups, do about remedies in order to realize world order values? This is the transition question.

Soviet Academician Andrei Sakharov has recently described one of the transition strategies he would recommend for a preferred world order:

> "In the opinion of the author, it is necessary to have a tax on the developed countries equal to 20 per cent of the national income for the next fifteen years. The introduction of such a tax would automatically lead to a significant decrease in expenditures for weapons. Such joint aid would considerably help to stabilize and improve the position of most underdeveloped countries; it would limit the influence of extremists of all

> types.....Mankind can develop painlessly only by viewing itself in the demographic sense as a unit, as one family without divisions into nations, except from the point of view of history and traditions." 1)

Whether Sakharov has developed a desirable and feasible strategy is debatable. What is unquestionable and most important to notice is that a man of his standing and intelligence has begun to propose the kind of sweeping transition steps that must be increasingly demanded of leaders everywhere.

For us the transition problem is easily tied to the idea of mobilizing more and more people to focus on the interrelated problems of a more peaceful and just planet. One might argue that the 1970's will provide a decade during which there will be sufficient consensus abouth these problems so that a transition strategy can be worked out.

In discussing transition one should face up to the question of whether or not it is sensible to move in small steps or in giant steps. There are a number of ways to approach this problem. First it should be noted that the way has already begun to be prepared for taking big steps. The fact is that the process of global community has actually been taking place at a rapidly accelerating pace since the late 19th century, and especially over the past decade. In many ways it is unthinkable to believe that there is anyone on the planet Earth who does not believe emotionally that he is part of one world. Thus it is that "big steps" may be viewed as quite so big as they might have been just a decade ago.

Secondly, it should be pointed out that apart from their slowness in achieving the degree of change needed, small steps for change in the international system lack visibility and as a rule generate little enthusiasm among broad populations. A series of big steps--such as the creation of a supranational world police force capable of enforcing racial equality in southern Africa, or the creation of an ocean regime empowered to tax developers of ocean resources for the betterment of the poor states, or the creation of an environmental agency empowered to bring enforceable legal action against criminal ecological offenders--is now necessary. These would be highly visible political actions whose effects could readily be communicated to large numbers of people as holding forth the promise for rapid and positive changes in the quality of their lives.

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1) Quoted from Economics and World Order: From the 1970's to the 1990's, Ed. Jagdish N. Bhagwati, The MacMillan Company, New York, N.Y., 1972.

Conclusion

We have argued that the world order Matrix is a most appropriate frame of reference for any person who wishes to analyse or work for peace and social justice. This article begins with a declaration from former Secretary-General U Thant, who seconds our contention. With this in mind, one must carefully examine the quotation from the President of the United States. Two questions arise from his statement. The first is: Does the President conceive of these problems as global problems, either from the viewpoint of survival or the quality of life? The second question is: Even if he does, would the image of the world which he projects furnish us with guidelines which could provide solutions or by which we are willing to abide?

For the authors, the answer to both these questions is "No". Quite frankly, and again without going into the benefit of full argument, our view is that President Nixon and the elites of other major superpowers, seem to be concerned with these four problems only insofar as they may cause unpleasantness, friction or even the threat of force between the five major powers. Whatever their intellectual awareness of these problems, the elites of these powers seem not to have integrated them emotionally or ethically. For the moment at least, a five power balance of power world, which conceives a Vietnam as likely to be merely a footnote of history, is so devoid of a vision of a global community with compassion, that, even if it were to work--and we have strong doubts that it would--we would personally not want to become part of it, and we know that there are hundreds of millions of people throughout the world who share that feeling.

We wish to make clear that in our view, imagining alternative futures, proposing transition strategies consonant with realizing world order values, are not tasks to be relegated to the distant future. We know that national leaders, encapsulated by visions of the 18th and 19th centuries, are in the process of attempting to implement their own visions of world order, in which the balance of power is more significant than the realization of world order values. If a more peaceful and just world is to become a reality, the input of hundreds of thousands, if not millions of human beings, and their humane visions of world order, must replace those presently being acted upon by these anachronistic decision-makers.

MICHAEL BANKS (Great Britain)

A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF RESEARCH AND TEACHING ON PROBLEMS OF PEACE AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION x)

Of the many topics which may be discussed under the above very broad heading, two have been selected for elaboration in this brief introductory statement. They are, first, the problem of scope or content of the field. We need to attempt to build a consensus about just what problems we are seeking to understand when we describe ourselves as "peace researchers". And secondly, there is the problem of objectives. We need to be quite clear about what it is that marks down a man as a full-fledged peace-researcher. Is he just another social scientist, a man who happens to have "majored" in conflict analysis but who might just as well have studied accountancy or law or environmental planning? Or is he like the doctor or soldier, a man whose selection for a particular vocational training included a check of his attitudes and values as well as of his abilities and his health, and who must pass some specialized ritual or take a loyalty oath before he is allowed to apply what he has learned?

Defining the Field

In Britain at least, there is real confusion on both the topics mentioned. In different universities there are now a number of courses which deal with defence policy, strategic studies, classical international relations studies, conflict analysis, general social theory and many others of a similar broad type. Some of these might qualify (regardless of their titles) as peace and conflict theory, others not. Much narrower courses also exist, some with titles as specific as 'the causes of war' or 'the consequences of revolution'. Yet there exists no consensus as yet on whether peace and conflict theory is, or should be, a field to be recognized as one capable of standing alongside psychology or political science.

And a one-day conference of some thirty teachers from a variety of British universities, held in the spring of 1971, was not able to identify any institutional means for clarifying the situation. The universities are independent;

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x) Paper prepared for the UNESCO Advisory Meeting of Experts on Research and Teaching on Problems of Peace and Conflict Resolution. Manila, Philippines, 29 November - 3 December 1971.

they can only be encouraged, not coerced, and they tend to move slowly. The existence, activities and encouragement of bodies like IPRA, UNESCO and the Conflict Research Society of Great Britain can help in pushing academic departments gently towards the adoption of new courses, but that is all. In this as in many other fields, what may well be crucial is the supply of deeds rather than words. If an aspiring teacher of a peace research course at a British university is to succeed in his proposals to the faculty board or other authoritative academic body for a new programme or even a whole new degree, he needs a vastly impressive bibliography as ammunition. Slogans will not do. We must have more books, better books, and books which are specialized within the field so that methodology, values, findings, philosophy and other aspects of the subject are each clearly distinguished, and expounded by reference to separate groups of scholarly works.

The lack of identity of the peace and conflict research field raises problems of particular severity in the matter of academic appointments. The awareness that scholarly tradition, not god or nature, divides up reality into things called 'subjects' is by no means new. But only those who suffer the consequences of this can appreciate what it means to be an economist trying to master and then to gain acceptance for a conflict analysis course, or a social psychologist trying to persuade a group of established political scientists to take seriously the idea that psychology and politics can meet in a new, productive field of inquiry.

These problems apart, the experience of ten years of the peace research movement does now make it possible to draw a conceptual map of the field. Such a map is set out below. The agreed core of theory which is used in the procedure of conflict analysis is very small, yet the members of the peace research movement do seem to feel that theirs is a distinct field.

"Conflict analysis" cannot in practice be discussed at all seriously without coming up against the problems of biased perception, the social position of the researcher, and the moral consequences of intervention in conflict situations. Self-conscious awareness of these problem areas is a characteristic of members of the peace research movement. Since it was the activity of that movement that produced the 'conflict analysis' field, I propose to set the boundaries of the topical discussion relevant to conflict analysis by asking 'what do peace researchers do'? Peace research, therefore, is the wide field, and conflict theory is a topic within it.

Defining Peace Research

There seem to be two ways of deciding what our field is: the exclusive, and the inclusive. The exclusive approach consists of setting out some principles about peace research (defined as a set of problems); about the discipline which we apply to it (defined as a set of theories and methods); and perhaps also something about ourselves viewed sociologically as a particular group of researchers. I submit that we all do make assumptions of this kind about our work and ourselves, though we are intuitive rather than systematic about it. We know what peace research is though it is not easy to be precise.
The kinds of principles I suggest we apply are:

a) In terms of focus, peace research is mainly concerned with processes of conflict, violence, oppression and peaceful relationships at all social levels. This implies that we exclude, by the criterion of relevance, work not seemingly connected with these phenomena.

b) in terms of values, peace research is humanistic, progressive, on the side of the underdog, and therefore ultimately political. It takes a stand, and it rejects what it regards as immoral or irresponsible uses of the power of social sciences.

c) in terms of methodology, peace research is systematic, as scientific as may be, aiming at objective and replicable scholarship. Values come into the picture initially, in the choice of research topic, and finally, in the evaluation and use of findings; they are not supposed to affect the analytic work in between these stages.

d) in terms of scholarly perspective or intellectual doctrine, peace research is interdisciplinary, which is perhaps another way of saying it is (or wants to become) a new field. It rejects the established academic subject/department boundaries and their analytic/doctrinal consequences, for example that of the subject international relations within which it is widely held that the international political system is a unique system and consequently not susceptible of explanation by reference to behaviour at any other systems level. Instead, peace research espouses doctrines like that of the relevance of general system theory, and aims ultimately at the construction of an integrated social science.

For our purpose I suggest that this exclusive kind of definitional approach should be rejected. It might be convenient in principle to have available some propositions which tell us what work is not peace research, but the ones set out above are not nearly sharp enough to do this, and I do not know of better ones. In any case it is invidious to engage in the implied criticisms of the work of others which seem to occur once such boundaries start to be drawn. For some purposes, e.g. the fashionable one of drawing up lists of institutes, scholars, and work in progress "in peace research", it may be necessary. But it also is usually quite unsatisfactory as we all know from reading the IPRA newsletter. However, we cannot neglect these principles altogether.

The inclusive approach seems rather more helpful for our purposes here. Using this approach, one simply compiles a schedule of things actually done by those who call themselves conflict theorists or peace researchers. That is basically what is set out below. In addition, I have taken the problem one stage further, by arranging the topics in an order which (to me) makes sense of them. In Section A, I suggest some of the issues which have attracted the attention of peace researchers and drawn them into this field. Section B is, I suggest, the minimum of basic definition, theories and findings which we may all agree upon as constituting what we have to offer the world at this point in our disciplinary history. Section C is the forthcoming agenda: fields of inquiry which we must tackle if the peace research movement is to fulfil its objective (?) of helping to make the world a better place.

A. The Problem Area

1. Overt or direct violence, otherwise known as a dysfunctional form of conflict.

2. Structural violence, long known under superficial titles like 'oppression' but only recently defined within peace research as the more subtle and more important form of violence.

3. The organisation of world society; defined as a system with three prime components:

   - the globe and its resources, providing an environment
   - mankind as a group, needing to be viewed in terms of systems analysis, e.g. are nation-states sufficiently functional sub-systems

- the individual human being - important as the source of values for the peace researcher.

B. Conflict Theory: Definitions, Theories, Findings

1. Definitions and Properties of Conflict

   - the Galtung triangle: interests/values, attitudes behaviour
   - distinction from competition
   - the debate over subjectivity versus objectivity
   - symmetric versus asymmetric forms
   - definition of parties
   - identification of issues
   - dimensions of conflict and its complexity
   - similarity of conflict at all social levels

2. The Social Context of Conflict

   - functionality and dysfunctionality
   - relationship of conflict to processes of change
   - relationship to institutions, law, organisations

3. The Origins, Causes, Sources of Conflict and Its Incidence

   - psychological approach: aggression theory and frustration
   - biological/ethological approaches: crowding, innate instincts, etc.
   - sociological approaches: rank disequilibrium theory
   - strategic approaches: rational competition and the use of force and bargaining
   - systems approaches: conflict theory as random disturbance, chaos, human error, faulty design and operation of structures and processes, failed communications, etc.

4. Conflict Dynamics

- psychological approaches
  mirror images, false perception, polarisation, etc.
- strategic approaches
  bargaining theory, Richardson processes
- crisis studies
  multidisciplinary; the special case within dynamics theory
- escalation and spillover between systems levels

5. Conflict Termination

- basic distinctions: settlement, resolution, transformation, perpetuation
- authoritative peacekeeping
- mediation and other forms of constructive intervention
- distinct processes applicable to symmetric vs. asymmetric conflicts

6. Peace Theory

- the values and roles of the conflict researcher/consultant
- the stages of transformation of asymmetric conflict:
  ignorance to awareness, awareness to confrontation, confrontation to resolution; development
- types of peace thinking
- epistemology: intellectual, practical, political status of theories and findings of the peace researcher
- problems of application of peace and conflict theory

C. <u>The Forthcoming Agenda</u>

1. Forecasting: methodology, applications

2. Planning and forms of social control which are consistent with basic values, e.g. concern within peace research now with problem of nonviolent revolution.

3. The promotion of human rights and institutionalised means of peaceful social change.

4. The establishment of a peace profession, i.e. a discipline whose members specialize both in 'pure' conflict theory and research and in 'applied' research, action and training:
   e.g. social work and development:
   experts in peaceful change education, especially its 'political' forms;
   peacemaking: military peacekeepers, mediators, conflict consultants.

5. The legitimization of a peace profession, by acting to produce social acceptance of peace researchers as experts.

In conclusion, it is important to return to the concept of "objectives" and to consider the question of what we hope to achieve by offering programmes of study, and of research, and of the even more purposive activity known as 'training' in peace and conflict. Clearly, we hope to produce people who have understanding, in much the same way that any other student of any other subject will have some understanding of the subject-matter of that subject. But is there something more? In one organization where much thought and effort has been devoted to this problem, the International Peace Academy, it has emerged that there are skills which need to be identified as the objectives of a peace research training. The primary skill is that of analysis or diagnosis of social situation. Understanding, here, is linked to the ability to formulate the understanding in such a way that it implies a course of action, much as a medical understanding of a physical problem is stated purposively, not just as analysis but as diagnosis; the explanation itself implies one or more courses of action.

Beyond this, it becomes very difficult indeed to talk of peace-related skills. Peace, after all, is an open-ended concept - the set of social conditions which permits the full self-development of individual human beings. Skills which are needed in order to promote this objective range very widely, from those connected with the short-term activities of easing and remedying the worst excesses of present unpeaceful conditions, to the more utopian skills connected with the construction of alternative future social orders. There are profound problems hidden beneath these brave ideas: problems of political sensitivity. The simplest of these problems is that of peace research as politics. In any conflict, the peacemaker who comes into the situation as a mediator, conciliator or policeman, may by his actions help the cause of one party and injure the interests of another party. At a deeper level, the peace researcher who concerns

himself in a philosophical way with grand conceptions of a future world order may run into even greater moral and intellectual problems. Most definitions of "peace" involve some kind of abolition or exclusion of what we now call the political process, with its characteristics of compromise and bargaining and coercion. The implication is that to get rid of high politics and unsavoury statecraft, we need to break down our great political units and our giant organizations into smaller, more human and less political groupings. Peace research in this long-run sense merges with religion, with revolution (peaceful, of course) and with philosophy. But are these skills that peace research could sensibly claim to convey?

ALI A. MAZRUI (Uganda)

BLACK NATIONALISM, MAHATMA GANDHI AND PACIFIC SOCIALIZATION

The African team of the World Order Models Project has arrived at the conclusion that world order needs a world culture as its foundation. After all, world order requires a wide degree of consensus on a wide range of values. Consensus on such matters is obtained either through fear or through a shared culture.

Basing a new world order merely on fear would not only make that order more fragile and possibly transient; it would also distort the quality of human life. Even the fear of world destruction as the sole basis of a new world order could not be sustained without some psychological cost to man.

Shared culture has then emerged as the only effective alternative to shared fear. Culture thus becomes an infrastructure for consensus. After all, in order to get viable consensus on three fundamental issues, human beings often also need to be in agreement on at least twenty-one other issues. Consensus on fundamentals needs the foundation of a shared outlook on a number of other issues as well. Consensus in a void is a contradiction in terms, unless it is exacted by brute force.

A shared culture has already emerged on a world scale. International law itself is a piece of world culture. Starting as a system of rules to govern relations between European states, international law has since been virtually globalized as a diplomatic code. We might therefore place international law alongside such phenomena as the Bible, computer technology, the plays of William Shakespeare, the symphonies of Ludwig van Beethoven, the modern school, and Scotch whiskey - as elements which have entered the mainstream of world culture.

But the trouble with world culture as it has so far evolved is that it is disproportionately Western-derived. International law itself still bears the marks of its ancestry as a system of values which sprang from European civilization. In literature there is a disproportionate Western presence in the shared global pool. Western classics are read throughout the world - but Eastern and African classics tend to be limited to their own regions. No Eastern or African author can even hope to be a world literary figure unless he makes a particularly strong impact on the West. But a Western writer can shoot into world fame before a single Indian, Chinese or African reader has seen any of his

works.

Even the world prizes for excellence are Western-based and Western-awarded. The Nobel Prize winner from the Non-Western world is, by definition, someone who has first had to convince a collection of northern Europeans of the merit of his work.

But among the leaders of thought from the non-Western world that have now entered world culture Mahatma Gandhi must of course be included. It is arguable that even he had to have a constituency in the Western world before he could attain adequate global stature. He had to appeal to the Christian sensibilities of the West to some extent before he could become universally conspicuous.

But although his impact on the West was an important pre-condition for his emergence as a world figure, Gandhi nevertheless has an enormous local constituency, the Indian sub-continent. Through this, and through the distinctiveness of Satyagraha (soul force) as a technique of protest, he captured the imagination of a significantly large segment of the human race to be able to enter the mainstream of world culture.

This paper proposes to look at Gandhi's impact on black nationalism, and to assess that impact in terms of the process of pacific socialization. Of course the term pacific has associations both with a major arena of ocean welfare, on one side, and a simple English word meaning "peaceable and unwarlike", on the other. Perhaps the double entendre is appropriate, implying the continuing tension between peace-ability and war in human affairs, as well a tension between words and realities. By pacific socialization we therefore mean a system of transmitting values which are oriented towards minimizing violence and enhancing a preference for peace. To that extent, pacific socialization is a special kind or special aspect of political socialization.

In tracing the impacts of Gandhism on black nationalistic perspectives, we also hope to draw out the sociological constraints which define the limits of effectiveness for pacific socialization. The constraints should introduce a note of humility in our assessment concerning the boundaries of peace education at large.

Gandhi in Black History

India was the first non-white British dependency to emerge from colonial rule. This fact alone was bound to influence anti-colonial movements elsewhere in the Empire. One area which felt the impact of the Indian example was West Africa.

"Inspired by the example of the Indian Congress Party ... a few educated Africans in the British West African territories organized the National Congress of British West Africa", James S. Coleman reminded us 1). The West African Congress was established in 192o, following a conference at Accra which was called by Caseley Hayford, the distinguished Gold Coast barrister and a founding father of Ghanaian nationalism.

For a while the most admired aspect of the Indian National Movement was its apparent success in unifying diverse groups. In that same year of 1920 the Lagos Weekly Record, a pioneer nationalist paper in Nigeria, had the following observations to make:

> "West Africans have discovered today what the Indians ... discovered thirty-five years ago, that placed as they were under the controlling influence of the foreign power, it was essential to their well being that they should make a common cause and develop national unity ... We hope the day will soon come when ... Hausas, Yorubas, and Ibos will make a common stand and work hand in hand for their common fatherland." 2)

Sixteen years later the most admired feature of the Indian National Movement was still its apparent unity. Chief H.O. Davies of Nigeria affirmed in 1936:

> "Africans should follow India - the only way is for Africans to cooperate and make sacrifices in the struggle for freedom." 3)

But the emergence of the Muslim League in India as a serious secessionist movement soon shattered the myth of unity in the Indian model. A new word entered the vocabulary of West African nationalism - the word was Pakistanism. The fear of such a bid for secession became more pronounced in Africa as the Muslim League in India approached its goal. In 1947 Obafemi Awolowo, the leader of Nigerian nationalism in the Western region, and still a major figure in Nigerian politics, made the following observations:

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1) J.S. Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press), 1958, p. 191

2) See: Lagos Weekly Record, April 20, 1920

3) Cited by Coleman op.cit., p. 203

"With regard to the effect of religious differences on political unity, India is an outstanding example. Her experience is well worth bearing in mind in tackling the Constitutional problems of Nigeria." 4)

More than ten years later Nigeria was still worried about the danger of secessionism based on religion. Independence was only two years away, as it turned out. But Namdi Azikiwe, the father of modern Nigerian nationalism and later first President of the Republic of Nigeria, was all too conscious of the risks of dissension. He said:

"It is essential that it will be not created in order to encourage a Pakistan in this country. The North and the South are one, whether we wish it or not. The forces of history have made it so. We have a common destiny ..." 5)

Azikiwe was an Ibo and a Christian. The tragedy of Nigeria had yet to be explored in all its devastation. The Nigerian Civil War was in effect basically ethnic rather than religious, but the Biafran propaganda machine was very effective in exploiting the Christian sensibilities of the Western world, and portraying the war in a manner reminiscent of the tactics of the Muslim League in British India.

But well before the Nigerian tragedy, the experience of the Indian sub-continent had indeed ceased to be the model of national unity for which it had been admired in the 1920's. On the contrary, the Indian sub-continent became a lesson to Africa on the dangers of dissension. Nigeria, because of its rough division between a Muslim North and a Christian South, was particularly haunted by the danger of partition - and that later tragedy which engulfed the country made those forebodings all the more poignant. But Nigeria was not the only African country that had drawn this kind of lesson from India's experience. The Convention Peoples' Party of the Gold Coast included in its 1954 Election Manifesto the following battle cry:

"We have seen the tragedy of religious communalism in India and elsewhere. Don't let us give it a chance to take root and flourish in Ghana. Down

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4) O. Awolowo: Path to Nigerian Freedom (London: Faber and Faber, 1947) pp. 50-53

5) N. Azikiwe: Zik: A selection from the speeches of Namdi Azikiwe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1961) p. 102

with Pakistanism!"6)

What was growing was a deep sensitivity to the great link between violence and primordial identity. The hazards of a pluralistic society had already been dramatically illustrated by the Indian experience. The incredible slaughter of Indians by Indians upon the partition of the sub-continent deeply affected many politically conscious Africans in the colonies at that moment in time.

Much later there was to be a second partition of the Indian continent - the breakup of Pakistan and the emergence of Bangla Desh. While the first partition which created Pakistan was a triumph of religion, in a curious manner the second partition which created Bangla Desh was a failure of religion. In 1947 religion emerged as a potentially viable foundation for nationality, and Mohammed Ali Jinah became the founding father of the new Islamic state. But by 1972 the Indian sub-continent was experiencing an alliance between a Hindu woman, Indira Gandhi, and a Bengali Muslim nationalist, Mujibur Rahman. Both the triumph of religion in British India in 1947, and the collapse of religion in 1972, were accompanied by carnage and horrifying violence.

It is against this background that the legacy of Mahatma Gandhi assumes its pertinence both for the Indian sub-continent itself and for the status of India as a potential model for the Third World. Certainly British India's loss of stature upon losing the unity of her nationalist movement meant by no means the end of India's potentiality as a model in other ways, nor of India's influence on the positive aspirations of Third World nationalists elsewhere. The Indian model in the 1930's had already been acquiring other qualities which came to compel admiration at the same time as it was losing its old quality of national cohesion. Pre-eminent among those new qualities were those which were brought out and sharpened by Gandhi's movement of passive resistance.

Quite early in his life Gandhi himself saw non-violence as a method which could be well suited for the black man as well as the Indian. He regarded the method as promising for both black Americans and Africans. In 1924 Gandhi said that if the black people "caught the spirit of the Indian movement, their progress must be rapid." 7)

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6) The manifesto is partly reproduced in: The Political Awakening in Africa, edited by Rupert Emerson and Martin Kilson (Prentice Hall, 1965) pp. 110-117

7) See: Young India, August 21, 1924

By 1936 Gandhi was wondering whether the black people, as perhaps among the most oppressed of all peoples, might not be the best bearers of the banner of the passive resistance. To use Gandhi's own words:

> "It may be through the Negroes that the unadulterated message of non-violence will be delivered to the world." 8)

In the United States the Gandhian torch came to be passed to Martin Luther King - who kept on affirming Gandhian principles as reciprocal race violence caught up with the slow pace of ethnic liberalization in his country. King, a devout Christian, tells us how he once despaired of love as a solution to social problems. He had read Nietzsche and his idea of the Will of Power - and this shook his faith in mere love. Then one Sunday afternoon he travelled to Philadelphia to hear a sermon by Dr. Mordecai Johnson, President of Howard University. Dr. Johnson had just returned from a trip to India. In his address at Philadelphia he spoke on the life and teachings of Mahatma Gandhi. Martin Luther King was so moved that upon leaving the meeting he went to look for books on Gandhi's life and works.

Prior to reading Gandhi, King had been driven to the view that the Christian ethic could only cope with a crisis of relations between individuals. The "turn the other cheek" philosophy and the "love your enemies" precept were only valid when individuals were in conflict with other individuals.

> "Gandhi was probably the first person in history to lift the love ethic of Jesus above mere interaction between individuals to a powerful and effective social force on a large scale ... I came to feel that this was the only morally and practically sound method open to oppressed people in their struggle for freedom." 9)

In a sense, if Jesus was Marx, Gandhi was Lenin. Just as Lenin had operationalized in institutional and organizational terms the revolutionary ideas which Marx had thrown out to the world, so Gandhi had operationalized in organizational and collective terms the love ethic bequeathed by Jesus to situations of man's confrontation with man.

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8) Harijan, March 4, 1936

9) Martin Luther King: Stride Towards Freedom (New York: Ballantine Books. 1958) pp. 76-77

In Africa the Gandhian torch came to be passed to Kwame Nkrumah, the leader of Gold Coast nationalism at that time. In June 1949, Nkrumah launched the strategy of "Positive Action" as a form of harassing the British authorities to grant one concession after another to the Nationalist Movement. Some of his fellow Africans in the country were apprehensive about the implications of the strategy. In his autobiography Nkrumah tells us how he explained the strategy to a critical traditional local council.

> "I described Positive Action as the adoption of all legitimate and constitutional means by which we could attack the forces of imperialism in the country. The weapons were legitimate political agitation, newspaper and educational campaigns and, as a last resort, the constitutional application of strikes, boycotts and non-cooperation based on the principle of absolute non-violence, as used by Gandhi in India." 10)

With the launching of "Positive Action", Nkrumah earned the name not only of "Apostle of Freedom", but also of "Gandhi of Ghana". Years later Nkrumah was to say:

> "We salute Mahatma Gandhi and we remember, in tribute to him, that it was in South Africa that his method of non-violence and non-cooperation was first practised." 11)

But was it really a tribute to Gandhism to refer to a country where passive resistance had still not paid? Would it not have been more polite to be silent about South Africa as the first testing ground of Gandhian methods? Yet Nkrumah was not being sarcastic. He was genuinely saluting the Mahatma as the intellectual influence behind his own method of Positive Action. The truth of the matter is that it took African nationalism quite a while to realize that Gandhism was not always successful. At the 1958 All Africa Peoples' Conference in Accra one of the major debating points became the issue of whether violence was, or could be, a legitimate instrument of the African nationalist. The Algerians were then at war against the French for their own independence, and they put up a spirited case in defence of armed insurrection, supported by speakers from other Arab African states. But black Africa was still not yet convinced of the wisdom of armed insurrection, and certainly not convinced of the wisdom of public acclaim of such

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10) Kwame Nkrumah: Ghana, the Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah (Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1957) p. 92

11) Nkrumah: Positive Action in Africa, in: Africa Speaks, edited by J. Duffy and R.A. Manners (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand, 1961) p. 50

means from the conference in Accra.

Two years later Kenneth Kaunda in Central Africa was still almost fanatical in his attachment to Gandhism. In a discussion with Colin Morris published in 1960, Kaunda conceded that where people were denied access to a democratic system of government, there was a great temptation to resort to what he called "non-democratic means". He cited for illustration the experience of Cyprus and Malaya at the time. But Kaunda then went on to emphasize:

> "I could not lend myself to take part in any such campaigns. I reject absolutely violence in any of its forms as a solution to our problems." 12)

Although Kaunda is not basically a philosopher at all, he did place his attachment to non-violence in the context of a broader philosophical view of the world. Curiosly enough, Kaunda seemed to believe that there was something unnatural in being non-violent. He did not share the romanticism which saw man as being essentially peaceful. On the contrary, Kaunda felt that "man, just like any other animal, is violent." 13)

Yet the distinctive thing about man is that he could conquer certain aspects of his own nature. An alternative way of putting it is to argue that the nature of man includes the capacity to modify his own nature by cultivating certain aspects and partially repressing others. Morally, man was capable of moving upward to a higher nature.

> "First of all we must understand that non-violence is, as Mahatma Gandhi described it, a 'big experiment in man's development towards a higher realization of himself'. This is obviously a slow process as all recorded history shows. Man ... is violent. But he has so many finer qualities than other animals that we should entertain this Gandhi thought ..." 14)

The Sociology of Black Gandhism

Evidently significant processes of pacific socialization have been under way in the black world to produce such adherence to Gandhian techniques. It is one of the curious things of history that, outside India itself, the torch of Gandhism

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12) Kenneth Kaunda and Colin Morris: Black Government (Lusaka: Christian Literature, 1960)

13) See the journal: New Africa, Vol. 5, No. 1, January 1963, p. 14

14) Ibid.

came to be passed not to fellow Asians, but to black people in the new world and in Africa. It was not without significance that the first non-white winners of the Nobel Prize for Peace were Ralph Bunche, Chief Albert Luthuli and Martin Luther King. Martin Luther King later came also, upon his death, to be the first winner of the Nehru Prize for Peace.

The process of pacific socialization had in fact included Western Christianity at play in the black world. Kenneth Kaunda, Albert Luthuli, Martin Luther King were all products of a devout upbringing in Christian terms. Even Nkrumah had many of his earlier sensibilities fundamentally affected by the impact of Catholicism.

The success of Gandhism in Africa while it lasted was a measure both of the success and the failure of Christianity. In some ways Mahatma Gandhi became almost a political antidote to Jesus Christ. Just as Saint Augustine had once allied Christianity with the concept of Pax Romana, so Christianity later came to be linked to the whole vision of Pax Britannica. In Africa,Christianity came to be particularly associated with colonization. In one of his early speeches of the 1940's, Jomo Kenyatta is said to have compressed into a witticism a feeling of disaffection shared by many other nationalists:

> "The white men came and asked us to shut our eyes and pray. When we opened our eyes it was too late - our land was gone."

Much later Albert Luthuli, himself a devout Christian, came to feel keenly the handicap which his religion was experiencing in the age of nationalism in Africa. Luthuli lamented:

> "The average African says the white man is the cause of all his troubles. He does not discriminate between white men and see that some come here for material gain and others come with the message of God." 15)

It was in the context of this kind of reasoning that Mahatma Gandhi sometimes became a nationalistic antidote to Jesus Christ. The message of Jesus had been used to encourage submission from the natives. The message had not been presented as a call for 'non-violent resistance' but at best it called for 'non-violence'. Christianity could even be interpreted to mean 'non-resistance' - a coming to terms with those in authority, whoever they might be. 'My kingdom is not of this earth' - this declaration came to imply what E.H. Carr called "a boycott of politics".

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15) Quoted in: The New York Times, March 19, 1961

But Carr was wrong in bracketing Gandhism and Christianity together as "doctrines of non-resistance". What Gandhi offered to black nationalism was the element of resistance, added to the passivity of imperial Christianity. Carr was wrong in extending the description, "boycott of politics" to Gandhism as well as to Christianity. On the contrary, as Martin Luther King discovered, Gandhism was for the black man a politicization of christian doctrine. 16)

What we have had then in the black world is pacific socialization which was partly Christian derived, but which was also to some extent in rebellion against certain aspects of Christianity.

The South African origins of Gandhism continued to affect the destiny of the movement for a while. It was between 1906 and 1908 that a civil disobedience campaign was launched in South Africa under the leadership of Gandhi, directed against laws in the Transvaal which required Indians to carry registration certificates. The movement did have an impact on African opinion in South Africa. Leo Kuper reminded us of a series of Gandhian protest experiments in South Africa in those early years. African women in Bloemfontein used the technique of civil disobedience in 1913 in their protests against the extension of pass laws to them by municipalities in the Orange Free State. The women's movement spread to other towns, and continued for a few years. In 1919 the African National Congress started experimenting with these techniques in Johannesburg. The Communist Party in Durban in 1930 also went "Gandhian".

The Indians in South Africa resisted in 1946 in a similar way in protest against the Asiatic Land Tenure and Indian Representation Act. Meanwhile the struggle in India itself was helping to give Gandhian tactics global visibility and capturing the imagination of politically conscious blacks in South Africa, as well as elsewhere. Then came the South African Campaign for the Defiance of Unjust Laws of 1952, again using Gandhian techniques of civil disobedience. But in the very wake of such tactics, the system in South Africa was closing up and getting more intolerant.

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16) See E.H. Carr: The Twenty Years' Crisis (Macmillan Company, 1939). Consult also Mazrui: Towards a Pax Africana (Weidenfeld and Nicholson and the University of Chicago Press, 1967) Chapter XII, and Mazrui: The Anglo African Commonwealth (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1967) Chapter I. I have borrowed from my earlier works and attempted to elaborate and clarify further some of those early propositions.

The Gandhian resistance in South Africa in the early 1950's was an alliance between blacks and Indians in the Union. It was in July 1951 that the African and Indian Congresses and the Franchise Action Council of the Coloureds appointed a Joint Planning Council. The aim was to co-ordinate the efforts of Africans, Indians, and coloured peoples in a mass campaign for the repeal of the pass laws, the Group Areas Act on racial segregation, the Separate Representation of Voters Act which was moving in the direction of further curtailment of the political rights of Coloureds, and the Bantu Authorities Act seeking to ensure a re-tribalization of Africans. The campaign was successful in terms of the degree of involvement of the three groups, but a failure in terms of its aims. The failure was even more significant as an indicator of the limits of Gandhism, and the implications of this for pacific socialization in Africa at large. 17)

Meanwhile strategies of resistance to racial domination in South Africa were regionalist rather than purely national. In September 1958 a movement called the Pan African Freedom Movement of East and Central Africa (PAFMECA) had come into being further north. The aim of the organization was to co-ordinate nationalistic movements mainly in British East and Central Africa and ensure periodic consultations on strategy and methods of agitation for self-government. At that time nationalism in British Africa was still significantly under the influence of Gandhism.

In the meantime, black nationalists in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia were becoming disenchanted with the principle of non-violence. Such militant nationalist movements from further south became more directly affiliated to the nationalist movements elsewhere in Central and in East Africa when PAFMECA finally became PAFMECSA - the Pan African Freedom Movement of East, Central, and Southern Africa. This was a major change. Before long neomilitaristic liberation movements from further south assumed greater influence within the organization. In the words of Richard Cox:

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17) For a fuller discussion of civil disobedience in South Africa in the first half of this century consult Leo Kuper: Passive Resistance in South Africa (New Haven, 1957) and Kuper's more recent essay "Non-violence Revisited", published in: Protest and Power in Black Africa, edited by Robert I. Rotberg and Ali A. Mazrui (New York: Oxford University Press 1970), pp. 788-804

"The Liberation Movements in addition to swelling PAFMECSA, changed its policy fundamentally. The use of violence was a recurrent theme ... Nelson Mandela ... of South Africa made an unexpected appearance and, to great applause, spoke of sabotage, of people turning their faces from the paths of peace and non-violence." 18)

Nor was Mandela among the extremists, although he was later to be imprisoned in South Africa after a grand trial alleging treason and sabotage. There were other voices from the southern part of the continent which were even more militant. But at least as significant was the report that Kenneth Kaunda, later to become President of Zambia, was the only delegate at that conference who did not applaud the new mood of violent militancy.

Something was happening in black Africa - partly under the influence of the very country where Gandhi had first practised passive resistance. South Africa was the cradle of African Gandhism - was it also going to be the grave of African Gandhism?

The Limits of Gandhism

As a strategy of agitation, Gandhi's Satyagraha depended on three clusters of factors for its success. It depended, firstly, on the qualities of the agitator himself; secondly, on the qualities of the regime at whom the agitation was directed; and thirdly, on the nature of the cause behind the whole crusade.

In 1963 Kenya's Tom Mboya - who had been Chairman of the Accra Conference five years previously where non-violence had been debated so acutely by Africans - made a remark which echoed much of the general African disenchantment with Gandhian techniques. Mboya observed in his autobiography:

"Even those African leaders who accept Gandhi's philosophy find there are limitations to its use in Africa." 19)

What limitations? Again some of the limitations may lie in the African himself; some may lie in the regime that the African is struggling against; and some may lie in the changing purposes and ends of the agitation.

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18) Richard Cox: Pan Africanism in Practice, PAFMECSA 1958 to 1964 (London: Oxford University Press, 1964) p. 54

19) Mboya: Freedom and After (London: Andre Deutsch, 1963) pp. 50-52

Within these clusters of factors lie the boundaries of effective pacific socialization. Socialization in the direction of a preference for peaceful methods of resistance may itself hinge on a variety of other pre-conditions. One important pre-condition concerns the general political culture of the groups in question.

Did the African share those aspects of India's political culture which had made Gandhism such a success in India? Such a question was raised to Nkrumah soon after he threatened Positive Action in the Gold Coast a few years after the end of World War II. Nkrumah was summoned before the Colonial Secretary of the Gold Coast, Mr. R.H. Saloway. According to Nkrumah, Mr. Saloway warned him in the following terms:

> "But don't you see that this Positive Action that you are planning will bring chaos and ultimate disorder into the country? ... now India was a very different matter. The Indian was used to suffering pains and deprivations, but the African has not that spirit of endurance." 20)

If this was a claim that the African was more prone to violence than the Indian, the claim is dubious. In the history of decolonialization there have been few slaughters more appalling than the carnage between Hindus and Muslims when the sub-continent was partitioned. We have also had the remarkable experience of the agony of Bangla Desh, again involving people of Indian extraction. And the history of India herself since independence has been characterized by recurrent outbursts of linguistic, religious, and other forms of riots.

On the other hand, Positive Action in Ghana was by no means the chaotic failure that Saloway thought it would be. Strategic strikes and demonstrations were managed with effect. Nkrumah had been haunted by the fear that Saloway might be vindicated. As Nkrumah put it, "Mr. Saloway's words hammered in my brain in mockery -'Now, had this been India'! ..."But Positive Action in the Gold Coast contributed its share to the country's progress towards self-government. And the failure of civil disobedience in South Africa was due less to the violent propensities of the African than to the extreme repressiveness of the regime.

Yet, on least one major point, Saloway was right. It <u>was</u> true that the Indian was used to certain forms of suffering and deprivation the like of which was virtually unknown to most Africans. For one thing, poverty in India can

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20) Nkrumah: Ghana: Autobiography, op.cit., p. 96

become more severe than it hardly ever becomes in Africa. But from the point of view of pacific socialization, an even more important consideration is that Hinduism sometimes makes a virtue of suffering and hardship. As E.W.F. Tomlin put it in a somewhat dramatic form:

> "If a half-naked or wholly naked Hindu ... (deliberately) starves himself to within an ace of death or nearly buries himself alive - or actually does so - we tend to dismiss these acts as mere wanton aberrations, the product of ascetic high spirits. Such a judgement is superficial. ... The Yogi is simply a man who takes the Hindu philosophy to its logical conclusion." 21)

This Hindu philosophy was probably an important contributory factor to pacific socialization as an aspect of Hindu political culture. And this in turn was a fact behind the success of Gandhi himself in Indian politics and the viability of Gandhism in Indian political conditions for a while. Gandhi became acceptable as a spiritual leader because the society valued the qualities of asceticism and self-discipline which he exemplified. And Gandhism worked in India both because Gandhi himself had become a spiritual hero and because the qualities of martyrdom and physical endurance which he demanded for passive resistance were far from alien to the Hindu temperament.

This is in contrast to the political culture of most African societies. As I have had occasion to say elsewhere, Africa has no ascetic tradition of the Hindu kind. The idea of lying across a railway line as a form of passive resistance would fire few imaginations on the African continent. As for the idea of "fasting unto death", this became almost uniquely Indian. There are indeed instances where the spirit of non-violent resistance needs a certain suicidal resignation to work effectively. This temperament of "suicidal resignation", complete with a philosophical tradition behind it, is more evident in India than in Africa. As an aspect of the political culture of the country, Indian asceticism has been profoundly relevant in the whole process of pacific socialization in that country.

Sometimes the qualities needed in the agitator for the success of such techniques of resistance become indistinguishable from the purposes and ends of that resistance. Certainly the particular role which is pursued by a leader could determine whether or not Satyagraha was meaningful.

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21) Tomlin: The Oriental Philosophers (New York: Harper Colophon Books, 1963), p. 231

As we indicated, Kenneth Kaunda was an almost fanatical Gandhian for as long as he was a nationalist agitating against British rule in Northern Rhodesia. Then finally independence came. Kaunda became Head of State. Could a Head of State in Africa, or indeed anywhere else in the world, ever regard it as meaningful to assert, as Kaunda had once done, "I reject absolutely violence in any of its forms as a solution to our problems?"

There was certainly an element of tragedy in what Kaunda was driven to do almost as soon as he assumed the reins of state on attainment of independence in 1964. Followers of Alice Lenshina, the Prophetess of the Lumpa Church exploded into acts of brutal vengeance against those they regarded their legitimate victims. Kaunda, an essentially peaceful man, was driven to make ruthless decisions - like the remarkable order he gave for the capture of Alice "dead or alive"! Kaunda as Head of Government was now embarking on a drive against violent fanatics - and Kaunda the man became almost guiltily defensive as he said "Let them call me a savage!" 22)

Had Kaunda completely renounced his old Gandhian principles of "rejecting absolutely violence in any of its forms as a solution"? In his defence it must indeed be argued that the doctrine of "absolute non-violence", which was never even espoused by Gandhi himself, would in any case only make sense if one was struggling against a government. It could not make sense as a policy to be persued by a government in power. One could say to a government: "Do not use more force than is necessary." But it would not be meaningful to say to a government: "Never use violent methods of law enforcement!" What if the government was up against a gang of armed law-breakers? What if one group of citizens was using violence against another? What if there was an armed insurrection by an extremist minority? In order to cope with such crises no government can afford to renounce the use of armed force. Indeed, political analysts since Max Weber have sometimes defined the state in terms of its "monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory." 23)

Kaunda in 1960 was a man struggling against a government. He was in a position to say: "I reject absolutely violence in any of its forms as a solution to our problems." What he must have meant was that he rejected the

22) Reported in: Uganda Argus (Kampala) August 7, 1964

23) Weber, M.: Politics as a Vocation, in H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (eds.): From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (New York: Oxford University Press, Gallaxy Books, 1958), pp. 77-78

use of violence by his fellow citizens against the government of the country. But Kaunda by August 1964 was the government of the country. And the Lumpa Church could only be subdued by counter-violence from government forces.

As for the degree of Kaunda's anger against the Lumpa Church, it might have been less due to the use of violence as such by members of the church than to the apparent "pointlessness" of it all. In an impassioned speech to Parliament in Lusaka, President Kaunda attributed to the Lumpa Church "a queer teaching that men must kill before they die." In response to people with such a belief, Kaunda assured the House:

> "My government will spare no efforts to bring them down as quickly as possible. Even if it means other people calling me savage then I am going to be one." 24)

Fortunately,it was not long before the Prophetess Alice appealed to her followers to desist from their acts and uphold the law. Peace was restored in Zambia. Yet the Lenshina outbreak remains a major landmark in the evolution of Kaunda's attitude to violence. With a rude shock he was forced to face the ultimate responsibilities of governing. Perhaps he even suddenly remembered that Gandhi himself never had to form and head a government Satyagraha worked in India as a strategy for winning self-government, but its relevance was limited in the exercise of self-government. Zambia in turn was now self-governing. But the strategy which enabled it to win this status was not "operational" as a method of ruling a country.

The ideological shock which Kaunda sustained as a result of the Lenshina outbreak was an important preparation for his attitude when Ian Smith unilaterally declared Rhodesia's independence the following year. Kenneth Kaunda was among the most vocal advocates of the use of military force against the Smith regime. Kaunda not only asked Britain to send troops into Rhodesia in order to safeguard the Kariba Dam, his government even claimed a secret understanding with Britain that physical force would be used against Smith by a certain date if economic sanctions failed to work. The British Government denied there had been any such understanding.But even if the "understanding" was wishful thinking on the part of Kaunda's government, it was a measure of a new attitude towards the legitimacy of violence.

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24) Uganda Argus, August 7, 1964, op. cit.

What we have in the role of Kaunda as President and his need to use physical force is, as we indicated, a merger between the agent of Satyagraha, Kaunda, and the cause against which the Satyagraha is used. What we have in addition, symbolized by Ian Smith, is the kind of regime against which Satyagraha would not work in any case. It may have been George Orwell who argued that the world would never have heard of Mohandas Gandhi had he been born in Stalin's Russia. The argument here was that the regime would not have tolerated a continuing defiance of this kind. Gandhi would have ended up in Siberia, or been quietly liquidated one night.

There were moments when Gandhi announced in advance the kind of lawbreaking he intended to perpetrate - and while the limelight of the world was focused on him he would proceed to engage in that exercise. His famous march to the sea to make salt was a case in point. The march worked because it was permitted to take place and because the limelight of the world was focused on this thin little man walking with earnest determination towards a symbolic moment of lawbreaking.

What the experience of British India indicates is that Gandhism works against oppressors who have retained some residual liberalism. The British officials in India itself might not have been liberal had they been left to themselves. But they were accountable to a society in England which was subject to liberal constraints. To that extent there were limits to the brutality which could be used to suppress civil disobedience without causing a serious political uproar at home in England. Gandhism worked against oppressors who would refrain from giving the order that the train move when agitators had placed themselves along the railway line to stop it moving.

That being the case, Gandhism could have worked in Rhodesia for as long as Rhodesia was ultimately accountable to London. This would have involved British pressure exercised on the local Rhodesian regime to restrain it from a brutal suppression of civil disobedience, and to encourage it towards concessions. But once Ian Smith successfully carried out a unilateral declaration of independence and the British restraining influence was severed, Gandhian techniques could no longer be trusted to work within Rhodesia. There is for the time being no precedent of a beleaguered white community, isolated in power in a former colony, being willing to give up that power without violence. What we have is the experience of colonial regimes withdrawing to their metropolis without violence. A number of the former British colonies and the former French colonies attained their independence without using methods which were contrary to the spirit of Satyagraha.

Even in the case of Algeria and Kenya, it was not an illustration of white settlers surrendering their power to Africans. It was a case of the colonial government in Europe no longer being willing to support the white settlers in maintaining themselves in power. The Algerians won their independence when de Gaulle withdrew the French commitment to the status quo and gradually recalled the army back to France. The local white Algerians were themselves furious and felt betrayed. They would never have given Algeria to Algerians if they had had the power to refuse.

Similarly, the Kenya settlers would not themselves have granted independence to black Africans but for the fact that the British Government in London was no longer prepared to maintain a white settler regime in Nairobi.

We can therefore say that de-colonialization in the sense of the withdrawal of a distant colonial regime back to the metropolis is quite feasible under the impact of non-violent protest. But de-racialization in the sense of ending a minority white government, in a situation where the white government does not rely on the metropolis, has so far not been accomplished non-violently. The only question which remains is whether it can ever be accomplished violently.

An internal revolution in South Africa or an internal violent insurrection in Rhodesia remain as almost the only potential techniques of ending white dominance not yet attempted.

But is there such a thing as international Gandhism? Is there such a thing as international Satyagraha? There may indeed be. After all, an essential aspect of passive resistance is, quite simply, non-cooperation. Attempts in Africa at boycotting South African goods, or refusing to recognize African passports, are all forms of non-cooperation. When a number of African states decided to stop trading with South Africa, that was international Gandhism. It was certainly the internationalization of the concept of Satyagraha in its non-cooperative dimension.

But the question still remains whether even international Satyagraha can work in a situation like that of South Africa. Are sanctions as a form of internationalized Gandhism likely to have the necessary effect on an entrenched racial hegemonic minority? Some experiments in this direction have already been attempted, but the outcome so far does not warrant excessive optimism about the efficacy of this kind of strategy given the regimes against which it is directed.

Yet in another racial situation, that of the United States, Satyagraha did work to some extent. Martin Luther King did symbolize a movement that was not entirely a failure.

White Americans, like the British in India, had in their political culture a residual liberalism. That political culture was not willing to allow too much brutalization against those who were protesting extra-constitutionally. Given that regime, Martin Luther King's tactic did stand a chance.

Yet even in the United States we have to look not merely at the residual liberalism of the regime, but also at the particular aims and the purposes of resistance. The American experience reveals that while Gandhism might work in increasing political and social equality, it is less effective in the task of achieving economic equality. The right to vote has been extended to more black Americans, partly as a result of Gandhian tactics. This de facto extension of the franchise has increased political equality in the United States. The right of blacks to share restaurants or buses with whites has been extended, partly in response to Gandhian pressure. This integration of restaurants, communications, and schools has increased social equality.

But the right not only to a decent income, but to an income commensurate with American prosperity, has proved more difficult to achieve without resort to urban rioting and violence.

Economic equality for blacks in the United States could either be attained through the triumph of socialism or through the full participation of black people in the central stream of American capitalism. There seems to be no adequate intermediate method of achieving black economic equality. Either the blacks must fully become a part of American capitalism, and have their fair share of millionaires, tycoons, and ownership of the means of production as private investors; or the blacks and the whites should become subject to a socialistic mode of distribution.

Property in a liberal political culture is too well protected to be easily given away without pressures which go beyond peaceful and Gandhian methods. Black people in Africa could win independence through Gandhi; black people in America could win the vote through Gandhi; black people in the world could win a seat in a white restaurant through Gandhi. But Gandhi was too ascetic, too frugal, too anti-materialistic, to be of much help in the fight for a bigger share in a capitalist cake. The black resort to rioting and violence in American cities, painful as it is while it lasts, may be an inescapable pre-condition for the economic restructuring of American civilization.

Here then once again we have outlined the limitations of passive resistance in relation to the ends and purposes which are being pursued.

Conclusion

We have sought to demonstrate in this paper the temporary triumph of pacific socialization in the black world, partly as a result of the dissemination of Gandhian ideas. But Gandhian ideas were in turn an element in an evolving world culture, currently still dominated by Western contributions in terms of skills and values, but potentially capable of being made more representative of the human heritage in all its pluralistic richness.

What the story of Gandhism in the black world shows us is, firstly, the importance of cultural interaction for certain trends in politics; secondly, the relevance of broader sociological factors in determining the boundaries of cultural transmission; and thirdly, the degree to which pacific socialization is not simply a matter of teaching particular values or particular courses but has to rely for its effectiveness on favourable social conditions and a responsive cultural environment.

And yet we must not lose track of the simple fact that Mahatma Gandhi did capture the imagination of people far removed from his own cultural origins. The future of peace education in the world could be significantly helped not only by a study of Gandhi's works, but also by a study of what it was that made his ideas influential at one time, and what it is that has led to their decline in effectiveness.

This should be combined with the commitment to make the study of Gandhism and its sociological and cultural environment an aspect of programmes of peace education throughout the world. The experience of a shared exposure to the same stimulation in schools and universities in otherwise vastly different national environments could itself become part of that momentous process by which the human race is at last evolving a world culture.

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WORLD PEACE AND HUMAN DIGNITY

If the "peace movement" in the world is to acquire legitimacy, it must base itself on a realistic understanding of the conflicts that exist in the present world and the causes of their persistence. Standing in the way of such an understanding is a certain intellectual tradition persistent in the Western world where the movement is presently located. This is the "universalist" creed in Western thought process, based on a conviction that the way to the solution of the problem of peace lies in the development of a strong sense of "world community", the conviction that a viable world order can only be based on the foundation of a "world culture". Further, there is a widely shared assumption that the world is already moving towards such a world community based on a mutual world culture and that the task of education is to hasten this process. Although most of the proponents of this viewpoint are not Marxists, the philosophy of history that seems to guide them is typically Marxist - the task of man and of knowledge is to discover the laws of motion of society and expedite them. Although their "laws of motion" are different from those in which Marxists believe and although most of them do not subscribe to the dialectics of class conflict - indeed their perspectives are typically bourgeois and their approach typically evolutionary - their basic methodology in respect of the role of man and reason in the process of history is not very different from that of the Marxists. What man needs to do is to put to use the vast potential of culture, communication and technology that has accumulated during the course of history. This also explains the charming but nevertheless naive streak of optimism and ease of style in a lot of recent writings on this subject.

I myself am also an optimist, but only to a certain extent. In my opinion, matters will improve <u>if and only if</u> men intervene in the process of history in a decisive manner, not just expediting current trends (except perhaps a few of them) but in fact reversing a great many of them. While I am somewhat touched by the vision of a single world community which would almost by definition be more peaceful and more just, I must say that I find this vision to be so all-embracing and universalistic as for all practical purposes to be trivial. Having been born and bred in a civilization where the great sages defined knowledge as being the search for the Ultimate and regarded the immediate and the next to immediate as profane and hence not worthy of attention, a course which brought their land to the brink of economic and political ruin, I must confess that I am deeply

skeptical of all profound visions of the future that seek to depict a perfect state.

These visions give little attention to the process of getting there and to the serious problems and conflicts which must certainly be encountered, or at best mention them and then take up the position that they cannot be solved except by waiting for a world which will be a complete negation of them. I am more interested in focussing on the movement towards a relatively better world to the present one - frankly I have little interest in realizing a perfect state. This must be done by means of diagnosis of the problems and conflicts which pose themselves, from which we subsequently can derive a course of action in order to defeat them. Let me make it quite clear that this is not just a plea for so-called realism or pragmatism in which the details of statecraft are more important than larger issues of value and choice. Rather, I believe that if we approach the subject of peace and poverty, of violence and justice, through the perspective of coming to grips with conflicts and problems and designing a course of action to deal with them, we will also be able to raise certain theoretical and normative questions which are likely to be either ignored or misconceived in more sweeping assessments and ideal type formulations that tend to omit these stages.

Two Worlds

I will in fact start with raising such general questions before going to more specific aspects of my own perspective on minimizing violence and injustice in the world. To no small extent the general optimism regarding the future of world order found in the mainstream of current thinking on world affairs is based on an assessment that the condition of the last one hundred years in which (to quote Kenneth E. Boulding, one of the leading authors of the Western world) there were "islands of stable peace in a world of unstable peace", is giving place to one in which we are likely to find ourselves in "a world of stable peace with islands of unstable peace". It seems to me that such a view is based more on a sweeping act of faith rather than on an assessment of emerging reality and is in any case based on a narrow conception of human geography. For surely the so called "islands" of unstable peace happen to be entire continents, most of which are beyond the Atlantic and the Mediterranean and below the 40th parallel, but they happen to represent a majority of mankind.

The reasons for this kind of argument are understandable. After all the world in which these analysts reside is more peaceful than was the case a hundred years ago. Nuclear deterrence has worked in this world - even if it means an ever larger allocation of world resources to the war industry and even if the world spends close to 200 billion dollars on the "threat system" and less than half a billion dollars on the "integration system" (terms coined

by Boulding). Finally, the doctrines of ballance of power, spheres of influence and containment of sources of global conflict have also worked to an extent. However, it is necessary to understand the reasons for all this pacification of the world and its survival in the face of the massive arsenals of human destruction. Built into this very scenario of declining threat of a global war are the phenomena of oligopolistic control of the weapons system, growing disparities in access to technology and economic prosperity, and above all a highly potent combination of domination of world political and economic processes by the super-powers and a policy of quarantining the vast populations that live below the 40th parallel by a mighty alliance between yesterday's adversaries. To put it briefly, it is by denying these peoples - or a large majority of them - their dignity and autonomy as human beings and as states that the dawn of stable peace in the world can be expected. In my opinion, this is not a scenario of stable peace and an integrated world but rather one of a sharp duality of the world in which both peace and justice are under continuous state of threat. Nor do I see the growth of a common intellectual culture enveloping the whole world under these conditions. Nor indeed the possibility of a "spaceship earth" in a "stationary state" - no matter what the technocrats are forecasting.

Perspective on Non-Violence

That brings me to Ali Mazrui's conception of a shared (as distinct from a universal) world culture. (See his paper in this volume.) Mazrui's conception is, of course, more to my taste than the universalist claim of Western authors as should be expected (given the minimal kinship of those whose vocation is to articulate the problems and interests of the "Third World"). For, despite his weakness for Shakespeare and Scotch Whisky (which happen to be my weaknesses too) Mazrui immediately recognizes the fact that what nowadays is termed as being "world culture" is in fact the culture of the dominant race. He would like to move towards a more truly integral world culture in which the intellectual and cultural products of the great Eastern civilization and of Africa - and I would add Latin America - would interact with the great heritage of the West, which of course no one can ignore. As an example of such a composite world culture, Mazrui introduces Mahatma Gandhi and his doctrine of nonviolence. According to Mazrui, despite the ups and downs of Gandhi's influence among the underprivileged peoples of the world and despite its limitation in solving the economic problem facing the world, this doctrine might provide a basis for a peaceful world order.

Now I do agree with Mazrui on the relevance of Gandhi to the times we live in and to the evolution of a truly

global perspective on peace. Gandhi is, after all, one of the most profound and breath-taking phenomena that the modern world has witnessed. And if we are to design a just and peaceful world, we all need to partake of the values and insights and exhortations that Gandhi lay before his countrymen while he lived and has now left behind for the whole world. But it is exactly as I say this and thus agree with Professor Mazrui's general theme that my differences with him begin. For I think Mazrui's treatment of Gandhi and his heritage from the viewpoint of identifying enduring principles of a just and peaceful world is not only too partial but also profoundly superficial. To identify Gandhi with the doctrine of nonviolence is to make Gandhi only superficially relevant to some and wholly impracticable to others, as is shown in the detailed documentation of Mazrui's paper. It is true that Martin Luther King in America and Nkrumah in West Africa and Kaunda in East Africa and other leaders of the Black movement were, at certain stages in their own development, deeply influenced by Gandhi's movement of nonviolent non-cooperation and passive resistance in India. It is also true that most of these leaders soon found out the limits of nonviolence in the situations in which they were placed, which has led the author of the paper to analyze the reasons for its failure in Africa. But the point is that nonviolence provides no more than a technology of resistance which may or may not work in particular situations. A given technology is necessarily a limited social mechanism suited to a given socio-political milieu. Gandhi's lasting importance lies not in the technology he advocated for India, Indians in South Africa, and the Blacks in Africa and America, but in the worldview that lay behind it and the values that he was trying to realize.

Gandhi's Diagnosis

As I see it, what Gandhi was trying to attain for his people was to raise their consciousness to contain nothing less than to fight for the autonomy and dignity of man - against the encroaching forces of imperialism, the centralized state, a technological civilization, and a view of man and nature and work which led to a continuous process of manipulation at all levels. Gandhi's concept of nonviolence acquires meaning only as part of this general striving for the autonomy and integrity of man, and as a necessary condition thereof and spur to it, of individual human collectivities as well. Whereas a particular technology of resistance may or may not work - and it should be remembered that Gandhi's advocacy of nonviolence was always both complex and conditional - this basic pursuit has universal relevance.

Once this is realized, not only do the limitations of the particular technique become part of the model but its alleged inapplicability to other spheres of life, such as in the solution of the economic problem facing poor countries, also turns out to be a misunderstanding of the basic approach. For Gandhi had vigorously applied his approach to tackle the economic needs of poor, capital-scarce, and labor-surplus societies, and had on that basis built an elaborate structure of prescriptions. Gandhi's alleged opposition to modern technology has been usually presented in a highly distorted fashion, but his basic opposition to the ethic of consumption and the ethic of production that were based on an increasing exploitation of the acquisitive spirit in man provided him with a basis for a more balanced view of various relationships - between man and nature, between man and work, between production and consumption, and between man's autonomy vis à vis others and his control over his own self. Nonviolence was for Gandhi an aspect of man's struggle for his integrity and honor on the one hand, and freedom through self-control on the other. Violence was to be eschewed not just because it hurt someone (or oneself) but rather because it brutalized the self and led to loss of self-control and freedom and the sense of one's honor and dignity. If preservation of this freedom and honor necessitated violence, Gandhi would permit it - as he had said more than once.

This aspect of Gandhi's teaching is enormously relevant today. It is really immaterial whether Hindus are more ascetical than Africans and hence more suited to the suffering that nonviolent resistance involves (Mazrui, pp. 54), nor is it terribly relevant that Gandhi was fighting against a regime that was liberal at home whereas the struggles in Rhodesia and South Africa are against patently unliberal regimes (Mazrui, pp. 54). The main issue in the pacification of the world we find around us is not just the success or failure of the technique of nonviolent resistance, but rather the more fundamental struggle for the autonomy of men and states as a necessary prerequisite of both peace and social justice. Boulding's expected "stable peace" based on current trends is unacceptable because it does not pass this test. Mazrui's advocacy of Gandhian nonviolence as a part of peace education for creating a "world culture", while unexceptionable in itself, seems to miss the essence for the detail.

Value of Diversity

If the underdeveloped nations are to acquire real autonomy, I would expect a greater emphasis on diversity of cultures rather than their standardization, a growing expression of national self-consciousness and assertion of what the propagators of the dominant race deride as "parochialism", and

a general self-assertion of submerged individuals, groups and nations. Speaking for myself, I am not terribly enamoured of the growth of a "world culture" or a sense of world community, and certainly not by the conception of some single overriding world authority ensuring "peace" and dispensing "justice" to all, nor even by the vague ideas arising out of the technological dream of a single spaceship known as Earth. Basically, I value the freedom of man and his capacity to make choices, the diversity of his culture and the integrity of his tradition, his ability to realize both his individual and his collective selves - all of this through acts of choice which are informed by a cultivated sense of control over himself and obligation towards others with whom he is bound by ties of kinship, territoriality and a common historical destiny. My conception of being of this earth is different from making of it a totalistic transcendental object of identity and loyalty; it rather consists of a certain "earthiness" which is rooted and which entails equal regard for the roots of other men and cultures.

As we look round the world today, it is precisely this primary prerequisite of a stable and tolerable world order - namely, the ability of human beings to control their own diverse futures and the futures of the diverse politico-economic entities in which they live - that is being compromised in the name of science, technology, economic development, and international peace. This is the case not only in the poor and underdeveloped countries but in the rich and overdeveloped countries as well. For surely just as a state of dependence generates forces that negate the values of freedom and dignity, so do the forces released in the centers of dominance. Of course, the more difficult and intransigent problems in this respect are concentrated in the continents - islands? - below the 40th parallel. The scenario that already obtains there and is likely to get worse is one of growing populations whose per capita access to both natural resources and capital goods is declining; where the proportion of the young in total populations is steeply rising; where education is becoming a profound agency of alienation; where the rate of growth of economic opportunities generated by the prevailing technological model is unable to keep pace with either the rate of growth of those seeking employment or the rate of urbanization; where unstable boundaries, alien ideologies, and the opportunistic play of big power politics are fomenting conflicts and violence; and where all these factors converge to produce the appeal of pseudo radicalism in the economic field and strong-fisted militancy in politics - without in fact attending to either the economic problems of the people or the achievement of genuine political autonomy and stability. I do not see how a "world of stable peace with islands of unstable peace" can be erected on such a basis except, as I said earlier, by ensuring "stable peace" for one hemisphere of the world through a quarantining of the other more

troublesome, chaotic, and miserable hemisphere, essentially by employing the old game of balance of power, more or less on the lines on which the "Holy Alliance" operated throughout a good part of the nineteenth century. I doubt, of course, if even this will work.

Two Dimensions

As I see it, there are two major dimensions of ensuring a world more peaceful than the one that seems to be developing before our eyes. The first of these is the achievement of a world consisting of autonomous states that are in a position to enjoy a much more meaningful equality of status than today; the second is the ability of these states to provide minimum living conditions for their peoples, which also entails a certain minimum of equality among them. It is by fulfilling these two dimensions that the prime value of freedom and self-reliance of human beings can be realized, and gradually a more wholesome approach to both nature and technology will become possible.

Posed in this manner, the issue before us is not to bridge the wide gaps that divide affluent and poor countries: this is neither feasible nor desirable. Instead, attention should be focussed on achieving minimum conditions for all,and certain maximum conditions beyond which it is considered unethical to allow consumption to go - according to regionally approved standards of minima and maxima. Similarly, in the political sphere, the issue is not one of evolving a single world community that will ensure peace but rather a community of self-respecting and independent states who learn to live together by virtue of their autonomy and equality and who are able to evolve rational modes of resolving differences and disputes.

A number of strategies follow from such a dimensionalization of the problem of peace through justice and autonomy and the broad choices in respect of those dimensions. I do not have the space here to lay out a full model of these strategies and the reasoning behind them; I have made an attempt to do so in my monograph written for the World Order Models Project (Footsteps into the Future, Delhi, September 1972) To put the matter briefly, it seems to me that we have to erect states and modes of cooperation between states which will fulfil the twin tasks spelt out above. I suggest that this calls for a major effort in self-help and self-reliance among the nations of the world, especially those below the 40th parallel. My own model for this effort consists of, among other things, a regional approach - a pooling of resources and economic and governmental systems. It is a model of a world composed of twenty to twenty-five regions, in the form of economic unions to begin with, and gradually moving towards federations of present day nation

states which will in the course of time become regional member states of a world federation.

The Federal Process

The federal process, in my view, is the only desirable as well as feasible mode of overcoming both atomism and inequity in world political and economic arrangements, of providing peoples with the sense of power and self-regard crucial to the growth of any genuine sense of community with others, of keeping out the murky appearances of the balance of power system in the various regions, and of enabling local politics to devise means of attending to the problems of poverty and unemployment on the basis of an exercise of choice in respect of relevant mixes of technology, economic policy, educational techniques, and politico-administrative systems. No amount of aid lobbying, urging capital owners to invest in underdeveloped areas, and general conscience-rousing by dedicated Westerners and angry radicals among them is going to do much good; it could do some harm, as indeed it has done so far. The balance sheet of both foreign aid and foreign investment, as well as of the new breed of white evangelism - namely, "exporting revolution" for the "good of the natives" - is so far negative on the whole, though there may be some positive gains in some areas - largely in countries which were bound by military alliances with one of the great powers. In any case, these mechanisms have made peace in the world more unstable than stable, for they have invariably increased cleavages within recipient societies and numbed the thinking power of their elites and counter-elites.

The basic reason for such a consequence of both the evangelism of foreign aid and the evangelism of revolution is that, based as they both are on universal solutions to human problems - there is more in common between the two than is usually admitted - they have almost everywhere undermined attitudes conducive to a sense of integrity , autonomy, pride in oneself, and confidence in one's own solutions and "models". If we are to achieve this, there is a need to have a structure of states and economic relationships among them which are conducive to these qualities. The only way of starting this process is by regional consolidations of present small and insufficient states, first on an economic basis - fulfilling Boulding's criterion of "exchange" as a principle of the social system - and in the course of time through political unions - fulfilling his second criterion of "integration".

Role of Education

The question arises: how does one start this process, or expedite it in regions where it has already been started? Here comes the role of the educational process, of the intellectuals, of a sustained dialogue between thinkers and men of action. In many of these countries, there is a great deal of self-doubt, lurking suspicions of others in the same region, stubborn legacies of ethnic rivalry, and not a little temptation among ruling elites to trade off their independence for a few crumbs thrown by outside powers or the multinational corporations. There are also deliberate efforts by the outsiders to single out some of the poorer countries and to heap them with favors, whereas others are discriminated against - as is clear from the policies pursued by the EEC countries. All this has to be overcome. Most of it is out of date, based on irrational fears and insufficient perception of one's own interest, and in any case not in keeping with political and economic autonomy.

During the last few years, the value of this autonomy has been going up in various parts of the world - Indochina, South Asia, Latin America, the Middle East - and it should be possible to remove the cobwebs in the way of its full realization. But with such an assertion of autonomy - if it is not to turn into regional jingoism - also goes a whole package of economic and technological choices on which too a major educational effort is needed.

In India, where we are faced with these problems in a big and challenging manner, these issues have come out in the open. What precisely is the economic strategy needed by a capital-scarce and labor-surplus society, where the single most important element in the growth of poverty has been the problem of a growing scale of unemployment which modern industry simply cannot relieve? What implications does this have for agriculture and the nature of land settlements? And in the non-agricultural sectors, what are the locational strategies involved - how much decentralization, what nature of consumption, what mixture of government provided welfare and familial and community based self-help? What are the implications of a policy of economic self-reliance (based on a deliberate policy of reducing dependence on foreign aid) for trade policies, for balancing both external and internal budgets, and generally for industrial and technological relationships within and beyond the region? These are only a few of the questions which call for definite answers. These issues are still on the anvil. The old techno-economic model, that may have been appropriate for a labor-scarce economy which had a long period over which to develop and was not encumbered by political pressures for distribution "while the cake was baking", will just not do - except perhaps by resusciating another colonial era.

Focus on Research

As we seek to work out the implications of a world structured along autonomous regions and pursuing a techno-economic model alternative to the one that has dominated the world so far, one item where educationists can play an enormous role is research. Perhaps the gravest of all colonial relationships has been in the area of research dependence. This is based on the facile notion that research - or R & D as the new jargon goes - is expensive and that in any case it is easy to import it from the metropolitan centers and then "apply" and "adapt" it. The result has been complete dependence in technology, in basic sciences, in economic structures, in intellectual culture - and through all these in international political relationships as well. Today, as various nations are aspiring to evolve alternative models of attending to their affairs, they find themselves hamstrung by this research and technological dependence. Meanwhile in all these countries the role of local scientists and intellectuals has been devalued. They too have lost their self-regard and have become appendages to Harvard and MIT and Sorbonne and Cambridge.

Alternative Model

It is necessary to start major research programs in both basic sciences and in technology, as well as in the social sciences and humanities in these countries which face quite different problems and call for alternative models of socio-economic and technological reconstruction. This does not mean that intellectuals and scientists from other parts of the world cannot work on these problems. On the contrary, here is one area on which a great deal of cooperation on a world-wide basis is possible. The only prerequisite is that it be understood that one is not working on simply "transferring" available knowledge (or "know-how" as the cliché goes) but rather in the exciting adventure of evolving new knowledge for creating a different kind of world. If the world is to move towards an order that is based on the freedom of men and states, it will need an alternative economic, political, and technological model than the present one which is suited to an order based on dependence and degradation of a majority of both human beings and states.

The development of such a model will call for work at a variety of levels. It provides a challenge for educationists the world over - provided they first educate themselves on what is really involved in achieving a just and peaceful world. What is involved is at once more important and more modest than the conception of a single "world community" bound together by a common "world culture".

Let me now move from this very general critique to a few pointed comments which I should like to address to thinkers and analysts of those living above the 40th parallel. (It would be best that I talk to you here in "I and you" terms - as from one living below the 40th parallel to a group of which the overwhelming majority lives above it.)

Let me say right away that my basic concern is different from yours. Your concern is basically what you should do for the world. You appear to still want to carry the burden of the whole world. My concern is different: it is what the countries of the Third World ought to do themselves - and how.

In my opinion the first move would be to undo the colonial system which still persists and the colonial psyche which is still potent. The worst result of the colonial period was the destruction of self-regard and sense of dignity of those living in the colonized societies. A large scale myopia was set in motion in which people began to hate their own societies, their own traditions, their own cultures. For these were not "modern", whatever that term may mean. It follows, then, that the paramount need of the time is to restore this self-regard, this dignity. This is why people like me are more interested in what we can do for ourselves than what you can do for us. Both the talk of raising aid or undertaking large transfers, or even taxing yourselves for us, and the talk of universality, of a world community, of a global perspective, seem to me not only distractive from the main task but perhaps a positive dampener of it. In fact I suspect that all such talk is a subtle means of continuation of the dominance of the dominant world.

I also think that the economic approach to world problems involved in these concepts of aid and taxation and transfer have the grave defect of being apolitical - of leaving out the crucial power dimensions: where power is concentrated in your societies and in ours; from where is it to be mobilized, by whom and for whom? It takes little account of not only the international but also the internal political dynamics of either the developed or the developing countries.

Let me also say that the other kind of talk in which some of your intellectuals are involved, namely of creating and supporting counter-elites in our societies and "liberating" us from our decadent rulers I find equally obnoxious and dangerous. I will put it quite bluntly: It is none of your business to come and interfere in our domestic political processes. Leave us to ourselves. There is enough wrong in your own societies and political structures. Try and change your own world and the sources of exploitation and oppression that you have engendered throughout the world. That will be the best contribution you will have made

to create a better world. We do not want to be liberated by you. We want neither aid nor ideology from you - I personally consider both your conservatives and your radicals involved in the same enterprise, namely of perpetuating your dominance over us.

That brings me to the notion of "bridging the gap" between poor and rich countries. I suggest that this conception is neither feasible nor desirable. It is not feasible because to repeat an America or a Germany all over the world will require such massive capital, such coercive measures and such destruction of existing institutions at so many levels that the utopia will turn into a distopia. But I also consider this utopia to be undesirable and reject it. It does not attract me. You have already reached your utopia - the only utopia that the Western world outlook ever produced - and you have had a taste of what it means. I consider "affluence" and all that goes with it as not only unreachable for our countries but also undesirable. Instead, we need to work towards a culture of sharing poverty and on that basis sharing prosperity.

We need to work towards an alternative model - a model in which not only minima are realized but also maxima are enforced, where consumption is not an end but a means, and where participation in both the productive and the political processes become the principal medium of social regeneration, while still leaving the individual to pursue his own self-realization through both a cultivation of the self and control over the self. (I have developed this model in detail in my book Footsteps into the Future.)

Now if you agree that such an alternative model for our future is desirable and needs to be worked out in practice, you can see that any tying down of the Third World countries to the world economic system through either "aid" or "integration" will only postpone this undertaking. The only way for the Third World countries is to take the initiative themselves to improve their own affairs and their place in the world. In my opinion, creative nationalism and not internationalism or globalism has to become the most potent force of contemporary history. This requires a number of things: realization of real autonomy in these nations, solidarity among them, institutionalization of the autonomy process through regionalization and federalization, and the formation of intellectual and other movements in order to achieve all this. The real gap that is to be filled is of political and psychological nature. Everything else, including economic development, will follow. There is no mystery any more on how to bring about economic development. What is not properly understood yet, however, are the basic issues of political development. The current literature on political development provides no guide to these issues. On the contrary, it is positively harmful to the kind of alternative model

that I have in mind here.

As part of this overall process and on the basis of the power that they achieve, these countries can, of course, ask for control of economic decisions affecting the world, the new developments in the oceans and the skies, even some return of the plunder that enabled you to develop yourselves and dominate our world and wage wars against us. But this will be neither aid nor sacrifice on your part; it should rather be regarded as returning to us what you owe to us in the first place. And, of course, when you change your world and the consumption demon that is devouring you, and if you are left with surpluses of capital, we would be prepared to discuss with you how to use it in our areas - on the basis of reciprocity based on a recognition of dignity of each other.

My assumption in all this argument is that the problem is not merely an economic one, but in fact much profounder. The economic problem itself has been made so acute because of (a) certain attitudes and behaviour patterns among both the colonizing and the colonized countries and (b) certain persisting structures of plunder and exploitations. As I see it, the need is to change both the structure of present reality and its culture - a change of culture being by far the most important. The revolution that is needed will need to be primarily cultural. But this will have to be on the basis of realizing the cultures of given regions and not of some enveloping "world culture". Rather, it will have to be the culture of political regeneration, of asserting our individuality as states, of so grouping and reorganizing our states that the wide gap in power that accounts for the present duality in world structure is bridged. In short, it is the culture of diversity that we should try to assert. Only by these means can we attain true integration.

The basic need, then, is not to undo "structural violence" or the likes through some transcendental mechanisms but to transform attitudes. The root of these attitudes, of course, is to be traced in the European enlightenment and its expansion throughout the world through the theory of progress. This has been the great dynamic of modern history and it accounts for a large part of today's patterns of dominance and dependence. (I have developed this point at some length in Footsteps.) In our attempt to undo this dynamic, you have a lot of educational task to perform in your own societies. And we will need to do the same in our societies in our own way. At some stage, perhaps, these efforts will become complementary and lead to a larger unity.